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  ABSTRACT 
The gendered effect of losing an election and its consequences 
on descriptive representation 
By 
Agustín Vallejo 
As in many other aspects of life, politics is not a one-shot-game. Most of the time it 
requires candidates running and losing several times before getting elected. By running 
and losing candidates can learn from their mistakes and be better known among voters in 
future elections. However, not all individuals decide to continue with their political 
careers after an electoral setback.  
 
In this dissertation I analyze gender differences in candidate persistence, defined as the 
probability of running for office in following elections. My main hypothesis is that the 
effect of losing an election on political ambition is stronger for women than for men. In 
particular, I argue that women are less likely than men to continue running for office after 
losing an election.  
 
I also argue that this gender gap may have consequences on representation because 
candidates with prior experience in elections – candidate experience – are more likely to 
be elected. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
As with many other aspects of life, politics is not a one-shot game. Most of the time, it 
requires candidates running and losing several times before getting elected. By running 
and losing candidates can learn from their mistakes and be better known among voters in 
future elections. However, not all individuals decide to continue with their political 
careers after an electoral setback. The decision of running for office always implies 
putting aside or postponing personal and professional commitments. Candidates who 
postponed these types of commitments to run for office and lose may experience 
disappointment and frustration. In some cases, this feeling of frustration can be strong 
enough to discourage them to continue running for office. Consequently, these candidates 
face a paradox: running for office and losing may make them more competitive candidates 
in future elections – because they would have some previous experience running for office 
– but at the same time, it may also quench their desire to continue running for office. 
 
Political scientists have referred to the desire to run for an elective office as political 
ambition. Scholars on political ambition have shown that personal characteristics of 
individuals can shape or hinder a political ambition. Among these studies, a large body of 
literature has studied the fact that women are less politically ambitious than men. This 
literature has shown that this gender gap exists among elected officials, who have to 
decide among running for higher higher-ranking, running for reelection and retiring, and 
among potential candidates, who have to decide whether to run for office or not. However, 
gender differences among those candidates who run and lost, who have to choose  whether 
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to persist on running despite losing and retiring, are still unexplored.  If cultural factors 
make women less likely to run for office, or when they already hold an office less likely to 
run for a higher-ranking office, we may expect a correlation for candidates who had run 
and lost. In this dissertation, I seek to fill this lacuna by answering the following 
questions: Are there gender differences in the reaction to an electoral setback? If so, what 
are its consequences? 
 
In this dissertation I use the candidate persistence, defined as the probability of running for 
office in following elections, as measure of political ambition. My main hypothesis is that 
the effect of losing an election on political ambition is stronger for women than for men. 
In concrete, I argue that women are less likely than men to continue running for office 
after losing an election.  
 
I also argue that this gender gap may have consequences on representation because 
candidates with prior experience in elections – candidate experience – are more likely to 
be elected. Recent research has shown that candidates can benefit from previous 
experience running for office even in those cases where they lost. By knowing who were 
the competitive candidates in an election, voters can coordinate a strategic vote against the 
incumbents in future elections (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016). Moreover, previous 
experience as candidate can also increase candidates’ chances of winning when they run 
for different offices and not just the office where they got their experience as candidates 
(Haime, Vallejo & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017). Then, if women were less likely to persist as 
candidates after losing an election than men, the proportion between old-comers versus 
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newcomers would be smaller for women than for men. Consequently, because of their 
previous experience as candidates, men would be in a better position than women to get 
elected. 
 
To address these questions, I focus my analysis on the city council elections in Brazil from 
2000 to 2016 for several reasons. First, legislative elections in Brazil are held under open 
list-proportional representation, a candidate-centered electoral system where candidates 
compete for the seats at stake with all the other candidates. That means that in order to get 
elected a candidate needs to be in a competitive party-coalition – which win seats – but 
also she needs to get more votes than the other candidates from her own party-coalition. 
Consequently, intra-party competition in Brazilian election means that to get elected a 
candidate has to differentiate from his co-partisan. Therefore, campaigns and also the 
effect of losing are both candidate-centered. Second, due the introduction and regulation 
of gender quotas, which mandates that political parties-coalitions fill at least 30% of their 
candidacies with women, Brazilian legislative elections present a number large enough of 
men and women running for office. Then, Brazilian legislative elections offer a sufficient 
number of men and women to test gender differences in candidate persistence. Moreover, 
elections at the city council are the Brazilian election with fewer barriers to run for office. 
The cost of an electoral is also relatively low in comparison with other Brazilian election. 
Consequently, city council elections are the place where most newcomers choose to start 
their careers. Finally, candidate self-nomination is the most common way to become a 
candidate. In comparison with other countries, gatekeepers in Brazil have a relatively low 
role in recruiting. Thus, the decision of running or not largely lies on the candidates.  
  
4 
1.2 Plan of the Dissertation 
The first argument of this dissertation is that there are gender differences in the reaction to 
an electoral setback. The second thesis is that the gender gap in the reaction to an electoral 
setback has consequences on representation. To test these arguments, the dissertation is 
divided into six chapters. Chapter two reviews the literature, establishes the theory, and 
describes the Brazilian city council elations used to test my theory in the following 
chapters. Chapter three tests the presence of a gender gap in the effect of losing on 
candidate persistence. Chapter four addresses the impact of having candidate experience 
on the probability of being elected. In chapter five I estimate the magnitude of the effect of 
the gender gap in candidate persistence on the percentage of women elected in the 
Brazilian city council.  
 
In chapter two I review the literature on political ambitions. In particular I review those 
studies that focus on differences in political ambitions between men and women. I place 
my work within this literature, establishing what is the gap in the literature and what is my 
contribution. Based on previous literature, I establish a theory to argue that, among 
candidates who lost an election, women are less politically ambitious than men because 
they perceive themselves as less qualified to run for office than their male counterparts 
with equal qualifications.  Losing an election has a stronger negative effect on women’s 
than on men’s self-perception of their qualifications as candidates. Finally, I describe the 
characteristics of the city council elections in Brazil and why they constitute an excellent 
environment to test my theory.  
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Chapter three tests whether there is a gap in candidate persistence between men and 
women. I conduct a regression discontinuity analysis with candidates who won or lost by a 
small margin of votes to predict their probability of rerunning for office in the next 
election. I find that, even though losing a seat has a negative effect on candidate 
persistence for both genders, the effect is stronger for women. I also run a second analysis 
on candidate persistence using an ordinal logistic model. Here, the dependent variable 
differentiates between running for the same office from running for different offices in the 
next election. The results of the second model are consistent with the first analysis. 
 
In chapter four I explore how candidate persistence improves a candidate’s chances to get 
elected. Using previous candidate experience in city council as the main independent 
variable, I explore how this variable effects, for each gender, the probability of being 
elected and the vote share obtained in a given election. Based on those estimations, I 
calculate the predicted probability of winning a seat for each of these four categories: 
men/women with no candidate experience (first-time runners) and men/women with 
candidate experience (those who ran and did not get the seat). Results suggest that having 
previous experience as candidates increases the chances of being elected for men and 
women.  
 
Chapter five explores the consequences of the gap in political ambitions at the city 
chamber level. The dependent variable is the percentage of women elected in each 
municipality, while the independent variable of interest for this analysis is the percentage 
of men and women running with candidate. Using these estimates, I run simulations to 
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predict the percentage of women that would be elected if there were no gender gap on 
candidate persistence, i.e. if the proportion of male and female candidates with candidate 
experience would be equal. I find that, if there were no gender gap on candidate 
persistence, the percentage of women in office would increase in 2.5-3.5%. 
 
In the conclusion, I recapitulate and summarize the core arguments and findings of the 
previous three chapters. Moving beyond the findings themselves, I consider further 
research for countries with other electoral rules. I also discuss the implications of the 
findings of this dissertation on other fields. 
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Chapter 2: Literature and theory 
 
 
2.1. Political ambition and gender 
The desire of politicians to run for an office was denoted by political science with the term 
political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966). Political ambition can refer to the desire of 
officeholders to run for reelection (static political ambition), to run for a higher office 
(progressive political ambition), or a lower level office (regressive political ambition). 
Political ambition can also refer to a non-office holder desire to run for office (nascent 
political ambition). That being said, political ambition refers to the desire to run, not to the 
concrete act of running and throwing the hat into the ring. In other words, political 
ambition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for running for an office. In the cases 
where an individual effectively decides to run for a specific office, it can be said that the 
candidate converted her initial nascent political ambition (be it static, progressive or 
regressive) into an expressive political ambition.  
 
Political ambition is a key concept to understand political careers and has been studied 
accordingly (Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979; Fowler, 1989; Herrick and 
Moore, 1983). Studies have documented its influence on a range of areas in political 
science including candidate emergence (Maisel & Stone, 2014; Stone & Maisel, 2003 
Canon, 1993; Fox & Lawless, 2011; Kazee, 1994), legislative behavior (Herrick, 1993; 
Meserve, 2009; Maestas, 2003; Nacif, 2012; Samuels, 2003; Micozzi, 2012), gender 
representation (Farah, 1976; Burt-Way & Kelly, 1992; Tule, 1981; Palmer & Simon, 
  
8 
2003; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel & Stone, 2006; Fowles, 1984; Sapiro, 1980), and racial and 
ethnic representation (Johnson, Oppenheimer & Selin, 2012; Perkins, 1986; Stone, 1980; 
Shah, 2015; Lawless, 2012).  
 
The literature has focused on two main sets of variables that shape political ambition: 
variables related to the political opportunity structure, and variables related to personal 
characteristics of the politicians. On one hand, the political opportunity structure refers to 
the politicians’ (or politicians to be) perception about the concrete environment where 
they make decisions about their political career (Schlesinger, 1966, Black 1972; Levine 
and Hyde 1977). On the other hand, scholars have shown that personal attributes of 
politicians, or potential politicians, such as age, gender, race or family commitments could 
shape (or hinder) political ambitions (Lasswell, 1948; Solue, 1969; Barber, 1965; Fisher, 
1971). In this dissertation, I analyze how personal characteristics affect political ambition, 
and I specifically focus on the effects of gender.  
 
Several studies have found that gender is a relevant factor for shaping a political ambition 
(Jennings & Thomas, 1968; Constantini & Craik, 1972; Kirkpatrick, 1976; Farah, 1976; 
Hoag & Farah, 1975; Fowlkes, Perkins, & Rinehart, 1979; Sapiro & Farah, 1980; Jennings 
& Farah, 1981; Constantini and Bell, 1984; Arceneaux, 2011). These studies have claimed 
that women are less politically ambitious than men. These differences in ambition have 
resulted in fewer women running for office (Lawless & Fox, 2005, 2012); and among 
those women who already have offices, the differences in ambitions have resulted in the 
lower propensity for women to run for higher-ranked offices (Mariani, 2008). 
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Consequently, the literature agrees that a gender gap in political ambition leads fewer 
women to occupy political offices.  
 
Jennings and Thomas wrote one of the first studies that explored the gender differences in 
political ambition. They found that among Michigan’s delegates from both Republican 
and Democratic National Convention, women were less likely run in primaries or general 
elections, and when they did enter these electoral competitions they were less likely to win 
than men (Jennings & Thomas, 1968). Other studies have compared the different 
backgrounds of men and women politicians (Jennings & Farah, 1981), how the type of 
office at stake shapes the ambitions (Sapiro & Farah, 1980), or if it is an aversion to 
compete or to hold the office (Kanthak and Woon, 2014).  
 
Other studies have found that under certain circumstances the differences in ambition 
between men and women could disappear. For example, after conducting surveys among 
Californian party activists and party leaders, Costantini has found that the ambition gap 
between men and women tended to become progressively smaller between 1968 and 1984, 
particularly in the Democratic Party (Constantini, 1990). Susan Carroll has argued that the 
gender gap in political ambitions disappears when controlling for office holding (Carroll, 
1985). She has found that between potential candidates, women seem to be less politically 
ambitious than male. However, between officeholders, women show the same levels of 
political ambition than their male counterparts. Consistently with these findings, in 
Comparative Politics, Schwindt-Bayer (2011) has found that female legislators from 
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Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica show similar desires to run for reelection for higher 
offices as their male counterparts.1  
 
There are three main arguments for why women could be less politically ambitious than 
men. First, some studies have argued that social and family commitments affect men’s and 
women’s political ambition differently (Carrol & Strimling, 1983; Kirkpratrick, 1974; 
Sapiro, 1982; Carrol, 1983; Mazey 1978; Thomas and Braunsten, 200; Werner, 1966; 
Lawless & Fox, 2005, 2010; Fowler & McClure, 1989; Fox, 1997; Carroll 1985; Deber, 
1982;; Werner, 1966; Burt-Way & Kelly, 1992; Mariani, 2008). Other studies have 
focused on how socialization affects the ambition of men and women differently (Frieze et 
al, 1978; Constantini & Craik, 1977; Lee, 1976; Fox and Lawless 2014b; Carroll, 1985; 
Johnson & Carroll; Fowlkes, 1984; Fox, Lawless & Feeley, 2001). Finally, a third set of 
studies have focused on the candidates’ qualifications (Darcy, Welch & Clark, 1994; 
Fowler & McClure, 1989; Sanbonmatsu, 2010; Fox & Lawless, 2005, 2011; Lawless & 
Fox, 2005, 2010, 2004; Lawless, 2012).  In the following sections I will review how 
family commitments, socialization and the qualifications of women can affect their 
decisions to run for office.   
 
2.1.1 Family commitments 
The first argument focuses on the different roles men and women have in terms family 
commitments.  According to previous research, women tend to spend more of their time 
                                                
1 Unfortunately these studies just looked at the desire to run and not at the effective 
realization of that desire, which can be hindered by party structures (Fox and Lawless, 
2005). 
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doing housework.  In addition, when both men and women have to carry out housework, 
men are more likely to run regardless of having housework.  Finally, both these issues lead 
women to tend to run for office at a later age than men do.  Having more housework, 
prioritizing housework, and running at later ages are explanations previous research has 
used to explain why women have less political ambition.  
 
The first characteristic about family commitments that is relevant to political ambition is 
that, women spend more time on housework and childcare than men do (Burns, 
Schlozman, & Verba, 2001; Galinsky & Bond, 1996l Verba Schlozman & Brady, 1997). 
A consequence of this is that women have less time to build a political career. Because of 
this, women are less likely to form a desire to run for office, not because they are women, 
but because they lack the time necessary to run for office. Even in situations where 
women do form a desire to run for office, in order to execute it, they would have to 
reconcile a political career with their other responsibilities—housework, and childcare. In 
contrast, men who develop political ambition will not need to deal with the same type of 
family and social commitments (Lawless & Fox, 2005, 2010).  
 
In addition to having fewer family commitments, Sapiro (1982) has shown that men are 
more likely to develop and pursue political ambitions in presence of family commitments. 
Contrastingly, women are inclined to decline their political ambitions for the same type of 
commitments. Moreover, men run for office without regard the age of their children while 
women tend to wait until their children are grown to start a political career (McClure, 
1989; Fox, 1997; Carroll 1985b; Deber, 1982; Kirkpatrick, 1974; Werner, 1966).   The 
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fact that women wait for their children to grow up before running means that women start 
their political careers at a different age than men (Carrol & Strimling, 1983; Kirkpratrick, 
1974; Sapiro, 1982; Carrol, 1983; Mazey 1978; Thomas and Braunsten, 200; Werner, 
1966).2 Mariani (2008) has found that female elected officials tend to be older, and this is 
because they run for office at older ages.  
 
The older ages of women when running for office can be seen as another facet of 
disadvantages for women.  The older a legislator is, the less likely that legislator is to 
express progressive ambitions, to run for a higher-level office, and the less likely that 
legislator is to win an office when running (Hain, 1974). Consequently, another reason 
why women express lower levels of progressive ambition than men is because they start 
their political careers at a later age (Mariani, 2008).3 
 
In sum, according to this literature, women are less politically ambitious than men because 
they react differently than men to family and personal commitments. However, most of 
these articles were written during the seventies and the early eighties, and they describe an 
image of women of that period. During the last two decades the role of women in society 
has sharply changed, and nowadays women have a more active role in industries and 
particularly in politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Given these limitations, the literature 
                                                
2 Contrary to these findings, Burt-Way and Kelly conducted surveys among city council 
office holders in Arizona and they did not find that female city council members were 
older than their male counterparts (Burt-Way & Kelly, 1992). 
3 In contrast with these results, Fox and Lawless have found among potential candidates 
that family commitments does not affect considering running for office or effectively 
running for office regardless their gender (Fox and Lawless, 2004, 2014a).  
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suggested other explanations for the gender gap in ambitions more according to the actual 
role of women. 
 
2.1.2 Socialization 
The second set of studies has argued that differences in political ambitions between men 
and women are the product of socialization. By socialization, scholars have referred to a 
cultural process that starts in childhood and conditions women’s propensity to accept 
politics as a “male sphere.”  This can affect women’s political ambitions either because 
they accept (socialization) or reject (counter-socialization) those socialization processes. 
 
Society has different expectations for men and for women. In contrast with men, women 
are expected to be more politically passive and home-oriented (Frieze et al, 1978; 
Constantini & Craig, 1977; Lee, 1976). Fox and Lawless have found differences in 
ambition between high school and college students. Their evidence suggests that early 
socialization factors, such as parental encouragement, sense of self-confidence, or 
politicized experiences, shape future political ambition (Fox & Lawless, 2014b). 
 
Complementary with the studies on socialization, some scholars have argued that there 
could also be a counter-socialization effect (Fowlkes, 1984; Clark, Hadley and Darcy, 
1989; Fox, Lawless and Feeley, 2001; Clark, Hadley and Darcy, 1989). Fowlkes 
introduced the concept of counter-socialization to refer to the process of women 
developing political ambition despite socialization. As a reaction of socialization, some 
women who experienced different stimulus can acquire values and expectation opposite to 
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the dominant norms, including, developing political ambitions (Fowlkes, 1984).  Previous 
research has argued that things that can lead to a women engaging in a counter-
socialization process are: coming from a politically active family (Fowlkes, 1984; Clark, 
Hadley and Darcy, 1989), involvement in associations (Fox, Lawless and Feeley, 2001; 
Johnson & Carrol, 1978; Sapiro & Farah, 1980), profession (Kirkpatrick, 1976) and 
ideology (Carroll, 1985; Johnson & Carroll; Kirckpatrick, 1976).  
 
As in the case of family commitments, the socialization theory makes a picture of women 
that seems to belong to previous decades. Socialization patterns have changed during the 
last decades regarding work and family life (Conway, Steuernagel & Ahern, 2005; Hesse-
Biber & Carter, 2000). Social expectations for men and women are not as different as in 
previous decades, and the gender gap in political ambition cannot be explained just by 
arguing gender differences in socialization. 
 
2.1.3 Qualifications 
Finally, the last set of bibliography argues that women are less politically ambitious for a 
matter of qualifications. A first set of studies has argued that women are less politically 
ambitious than men because women do not have the qualifications and backgrounds 
required to run for office. A second battery of studies has claimed that what shapes 
political ambition are not the individuals’ qualifications but their self-perception about 
their qualifications.  
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On one hand, some scholars have looked at the candidates’ backgrounds and found that 
party recruiters usually draw candidates from income and occupational groups that women 
were excluded from until a couple of decades ago. Then, fewer women are being recruited 
for not having the qualifications that party recruiters were looking for (Darcy, Welch & 
Clark, 1994). This argument does not seem to be valid to explain the actual gap in political 
ambition. In the latest decades, women have closed the gender gap in qualifications. For 
example, since 2014 the number of women with college degrees in America is larger than 
the number of men with college degrees (US Census Bureau, 2018).  
 
More recently, other scholars have argued that it is not a matter of qualifications per se, 
but what really matters are the politicians’ perceptions about their own qualifications. For 
example, in a qualitative study, Fowler and McClure found that female potential 
candidates show more insecurities about their credentials as candidates, which leads to 
procrastination on their campaign duties, and eventually, withdrawing the candidacies. 
They described the Louise Slaughter’s first attempt to win the candidacy in the 
Democratic Party for the New York’s 30th congressional district in 1984 (Fowler & 
McClure, 1989). In that study, she recalled: “I kept putting up barriers and thought of 
excuses, because in some ways I was afraid to go after it. I wasn’t afraid of the tough 
race, but that somehow I wouldn’t be considered qualified, or taken seriously” (Fowler & 
McClure, 1989: 113).  
 
Sanbonmatsu documented the same phenomenon from the recruitment perspective. She 
has argued that one of the most difficult tasks of party recruiters is convincing women to 
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run. In contrast with men, women are less likely to plan during their lives a political 
career. Then, when the opportunity of running for office appears, they tend to think that 
they were not qualified enough to become a candidate (Sanbonmatsu, 2010). She 
documented the testimony of Jennifer Veiga, an Assistant House minority leader from 
Colorado, who said: “Men are much more willing to jump into it than women. You need to 
push women a lot harder to do it, and for whatever reason, they feel like they’re not as 
qualified or they’re not as ready” (Sanbonmatsu, 2010: 126).  
 
Also, Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox have shown, through a large number of studies 
based on surveys conducted to potential candidates, that women consider themselves less 
qualified than men, with the same level of qualifications (Fox & Lawless, 2005, 2011; 
Lawless & Fox, 2005, 2010, 2004; Lawless, 2012). They have found that the initial 
consideration of running, i.e. nascent political ambition, among potential candidates 
depends on the self-perception on qualification as candidates (Fox & Lawless, 2005). 
They have also found that women tend to perceive theirs as lower than men (Lawless & 
Fox, 2006, 2010), but also that perception could change across time (Fox and Lawless, 
2011; Lawless, 2012). 
 
2.1.4 Concluding remarks 
The literature reviewed so far has shown that there is a gap in political ambition between 
men and women. Men are more politically ambitious than women, and there are three 
different explanations for this gap in political ambitions: the way individuals respond to 
family commitments is different by gender, the process of socialization creates different 
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socially desirable expectations for men and women, and the self-perception about the 
skills as candidates are different among men and women. These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, and the gender gap in ambition could be a result of a mix of factors. 
Based on these three explanations, the literature has shown that women are less likely than 
men to run for office, and consequently, women are underrepresented among elective 
offices. However, most of these studies analyze women’s ambition to run directly.  I argue 
that we may observe manifestations of the gap in ambition in other behaviors that also 
have consequences on representation.  
 
If we imagine politics as a game that usually requires running more than once to get 
elected, candidates can learn from running for office even in those races where they lost.  
Therefore, we must consider that overcoming an electoral setback is crucial for any 
political career. However, if a group of politicians is particularly less prone to get over 
losing an election than another group of politicians, individuals from the former group 
may be less likely to be elected. In this dissertation, I focus on the effect of an electoral 
setback on political ambition, and its gender difference. If women are more likely to feel 
under-qualified when running for office, we can expect that running and losing may 
reinforce that perception. Moreover, women’s political ambition can also be more 
sensitive to changes in personal and family commitments that may occur between 
elections, reinforcing the socialization stereotypes. Consequently, lower levels of political 
ambition among women may lead to women underrepresentation not just as the result of 
fewer women running (Lawless & Fox 2005, 2010), but also as a result of fewer women 
overcoming losses and persisting in their political careers. 
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In the following section, I elaborate a theory of political ambitions for candidate 
persistence with different expectations by gender. Doing so, I contribute to the study of 
political ambitions by looking at how facing an electoral setback changes individuals’ 
political ambitions. To pursue that goal I will look at the candidates’ decision to rerun 
after losing an election, an unstudied dimension of political ambition. It also may 
contribute to the study of gender in two ways. First, I look at gender differences on 
rerunning rates, and second, I look are the consequences on representation of the gender 
gap in rerunning rates. Finally, this dissertation uses data from elections in Brazil and for 
that reason it contributes to the study of ambitions in Latin America. In this sense, it 
represents one of the few studies that explain women’s representation in Brazil from a 
political ambition perspective. 
 
2.2. A theory of gender gap in candidate persistence and its consequences in 
representation 
In this section I develop a theory for a specific manifestation of political ambition: the 
persistence of candidates. By candidate persistence I refer to the behavior of some 
candidates who have lost an election, and who insist on re-running for the same office in 
future elections. Persisting in elections expresses how strong a candidate’s political 
ambition is despite an electoral setback. Those candidates who decide to persist in running 
for office have the experience of having run for office previously, and they can use it as an 
advantage. However, losing a race may have a negative effect on their willingness to run 
for office in future elections. I will also argue that there are theoretical reasons to think 
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that the effect of losing a seat on the candidate persistence is different between men and 
women.  
 
Let’s start with an example. Let’s think of Candidate i who decides to run for office for 
the first time in his life. Candidate i thinks he is prepared enough to run for and to hold 
office o. He thinks he could balance his personal and professional duties so as to give him 
room to start a political career, so he decides to invest resources such as time and money 
and throw his hat into the ring. Let’s note here that candidate i moved from a nascent to an 
expressive ambition. As any candidate who runs, candidate i can get two possible 
outcomes: winning or losing the seat. If he gets the seat, his beliefs about his skills for 
running and winning an election would be updated positively, and after his period in office 
o, he will have to choose between retiring, running for reelection or running for a different 
office. If he decides to run again (for the same or for a different office) candidate i would 
have two advantages in comparison with his previous race: he would have the advantage 
of having run an election before (Haime, Vallejo and Schwindt-Bayer, 2017) and the 
advantage of holding an office, usually referred as the incumbent advantage (Mayhew 
1974; Fiorina 1977; Abramowitz 1975; Cover and Brumberg 1982; Herrnson 1998; Mann 
and Wolfinger 1980; among others). But the interesting story takes place if he loses. If he 
loses the seat he also will have to choose between retiring or running for the same or a 
different office. If he decides to run again in future elections he would still have the 
advantage of having the experience of being a candidate (Haime, Vallejo and Schwindt-
Bayer, 2017; Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016). However the fact of losing the seat he was 
seeking in his first attempt may have decreased his willingness to run for office again. 
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Losing the election may have negatively changed his self-perception about his skills as a 
candidate.  
 
With the previous example I have illustrated the paradox that candidates who lost an 
election face. Thinking in the possibility of running for office in the future, on the one 
hand they have the experience of having run for an election before and this gives them an 
advantage respect to those candidates who run for the first time. But on the other hand, 
their confidence on their chances is lower than before they ran and lost. In their first 
passage from nascent ambition to expressive ambition they had to overcome all the 
personal, professional and political obstacles to start a political career. Then, in order to 
express their ambition again in the following election, in addition to all the obstacles for a 
political career, they have to face their decreased confidence.  
 
A way of showing how losing an election may affect future expressive ambitions is 
starting from Black’s model for political ambition (1972). According to Black, the 
probability running for an office is the following:  !! !"##$#% !"# !""#$% ! =  !!" ∗ !!" − !!", 
 
where the Utility (U) of running for an office (o) for a given individual (i) is equal to the 
Probability of getting that office (P) times the Benefit of holding that office (B), minus the 
cost of getting and holding it (C). The theoretical implication of Black’s model is that an 
individual will run for an office if !!" ∗ !!" > !!". 
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If we include the negative update of losing an election, which affects the self-confidence 
on getting the seat, and the personal costs, the formulation would be the following: !!!! !"##$#% !"# !""#$% ! =  !!!!!!  ∗ (!!!!! − !!!!!), 
 
where the utility (U) for candidate (i) for running for a given office (!), that not 
necessarily is the same than in the previous election, so let o={1,2,3,M}; in a second 
attempt (t2); is given by his perceived probability (!!) of winning that office in this new 
attempt; times the benefits (B) of that office minus the costs (!) of running and holding it.  
 
The change in a candidate’s self-perceived qualifications may affect his perceived 
probability of winning the seat. Then, the probability of winning an office in the second 
attempt is defined: !!!!! ! = !!!!! + !!"!! − !!!!!, 
 
where the new probability !! is a function of the probability of getting the seat in this new 
race (P) if the prospective candidate would just consider the conditions of this current 
office (number of seats available, number of candidates, strength of the incumbent, etc.), 
plus the experience gained in the previous election (E), minus the update for losing it (N).  
Then again, candidate i will enter in this new election if !!!!! ! ∗ !!!!! > !!!!!. 
 
Now we have a model for candidate persistence which addresses the experience obtained 
in the previous election (E) by a candidate, and the update in the candidate’s perception of 
the probability of winning the seat, result of losing the previous election (N). In the next 
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paragraphs, I will argue that, there are theoretical arguments to think that the update on the 
self-perception of the probability of winning the seat, and the change is the costs is 
unequal for men and for women, resulting in a lower rate of candidate persistence for 
women.  
 
Electoral contest can be seen as competitions between candidates for seats and votes. 
According to a large body of research, men and women behave differently in competitive 
environments, such as electoral contests. For example, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) 
have found in a laboratory experiment that, conditional on ability, women are less likely to 
enter into winner-takes-all competitions than men. They found that the gender gap is also 
present among the high performers, which leads to women with great prior performances 
to not achieve the same earnings than their male counterparts because their self-exclusion 
from competition. Kanthak and Woon (2014) have found that women are less likely than 
men to become representatives of a group, when the process for choosing representatives 
implies becoming candidates and competing in elections. 
 
Experimental and field studies have also shown that women and men respond to a setback 
differently. Buser (2016) has found that after facing a setback in a competition, men react 
by picking a more challenging target, while women react by lowering their performance in 
the following competition. Gill and Prowse (2014) have also found that setback decreases 
future performance for women, in a larger extent than for men, who just reduce their 
performance when the prize at stake is big enough.  
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In a recent paper, Buser and Yuan (forthcoming) have shown that women are more likely 
to give up competing in math competitions in the Netherlands after losing than their male 
counterparts. In the same paper they used experimental data, but they could not reach a 
conclusive causal mechanism4 that produces the different reaction. Instead, they conclude 
that there must be a direct negative effect on the willingness to compete for women who 
initially were willing to compete. Ryckman and Peckham (1987) and Deck et al (1978) 
have shown that women tend to attribute failure to internal factors (such as their skills to 
succeed), and success to external factors (such as luck), while men tend to do the opposite. 
Since elections are a competition between candidates to win offices this argument may 
also apply for politics.  
 
Lawless and Fox (Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless 2012) have gone a step further asking 
for the reasons of these differences in behavior. They focus on elections. Despite the fact 
that they do not look at reactions to setbacks, their findings can be an explanation for these 
different reactions. Looking at the candidate nomination process in America they found 
that, under the same level of qualifications, women consider themselves less qualified for 
running for an office than their male counterpart, because of a process of socialization to 
which both genders are exposed. The process starts at a very early age and has three 
manifestations of traditional family role orientations. This first manifestation is present 
when women are in charge of the largest part of household, child care and others jobs, and 
it results in less time and resources for a political career. The second manifestation, a 
masculinized ethos in politics, appears when politics are seen as a men’s world, and the 
                                                
4 They tested for difference in initial beliefs, belief updating, performance changes, and 
changes in risk preferences.  
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absence of women in elective political institution reinforces this ethos, keeping women 
outside politics. Finally, the manifestations culminate with a gendered psyche. That is, 
when the socialization process is finally internalized by individuals, women become less 
confident to enter into competitive environments such as elections compared to males with 
equal levels of qualifications, and party recruiters are less likely to recruit women than 
men.  
 
Based on the literature reviewed so far, I argue here that the socialization process which 
makes women less likely to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless 2012), can be 
also making women less likely to persist in re-running for office than men. Then, to 
include these different reactions to a setback by gender to the model of running for office 
which addresses for the previous experience, we have been constructing in this chapter by 
interacting the negative reaction by the gender of the candidate, such as: !!!!! ! = !!!!! + !!"!! − !!!!! ∗ !!!!!, 
 
where F is a binary indicator of the sex of candidate i.  
2.3. Identification Strategy: the Brazilian city council elections 
In order to test my theory, I use data from Brazilian city council elections from the years 
2000 to 2016. Brazilian city council elections present an exceptional case to test my 
argument for several reasons. First, the open list proportional representation system 
creates a candidate-centered competition in all the Brazilian legislative elections—this is 
true in general and in the city council in particular. Second, party leaders and recruiters 
have a minor role in the candidate nomination process. Therefore, candidatures depend on 
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a large extent on the political ambition of candidates. Third, the cost of an electoral 
campaign for the city council in Brazil is relatively low compared to other offices. Fourth, 
city council elections are the place where most of the political careers start in Brazil, and 
this also makes them the first place where political careers can get truncated. Fifth, the 
adoption and the posterior reform of gender quotas for legislative elections resulted in a 
large number of women running for office but just a small percentage of them gets 
elected. Therefore, the Brazilian city council elections offer a case with enough number of 
female candidates running for office, but an unsolved theoretical question for the low 
percentage of women elected. Finally, I argue that in Brazil there exists a process of 
traditional socialization that may lead to a gap in political ambitions. In the next section I 
will discuss each of these characteristics of the Brazilian local elections.  
 
2.3.1 Candidate centered elections 
First, Brazil’s electoral system revolves around candidate-centered elections; all Brazilian 
legislative elections hold an open list-proportional representation system. For the city 
council elections, the district magnitude goes from 9—for cities with less than 15 
thousand people—to 55—for cities with more than 8 million people5. Despite the fact that 
voters can choose candidates or parties/coalitions, voters usually cast their votes for 
candidates.6 Votes for candidates from the same party/coalition, and the votes casted for a 
party list go to the same poll. The seats are distributed to parties proportionally with the 
                                                
5 Table 1 in the Appendix presents the different district magnitude according to the people 
living in each city.  
6 Even though voters can vote for parties, it is not as common as voting for candidates. In 
the 2014 election for national deputy, only 8.4% of the votes went to parties, while the 
other 91.6% of voters chose a candidate (O Globo, 2017).  
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percentage this pool of votes each party got. The adjudication of seats among candidates 
responds to a ranking resulting from the amount of votes each individual candidate got in 
the election. So, if Party A gets N seats in an election for federal deputy, the N first 
candidates with more votes are those getting the seats.  
 
Despite candidates from the same party are adding votes for the same poll, candidates are 
also competing with each other. If they want to be elected they have to get more votes 
than the other candidates from their party. This electoral rule promotes the intra-party 
competition (Carey and Shugart, 1995), and consequently it promotes candidate-centered 
electoral campaigns (Ames, 1995).  
 
In contrast with closed list systems, in Brazil the candidates, and not the parties, are in 
charge of running their entire campaigns. Running a campaign implies that candidates are 
also in charge of fundraising, deciding how to allocate the resources they fundraise, and 
deciding the content and the strategy of their electoral campaign (Samuels, 2001).  
 
In this context, previous campaign experience is a valuable asset. Previous campaign 
experience, that experience gained by running in previous elections (even in the case of 
losing the seat), gives candidates knowledge about how to run a campaign, makes 
candidates more knowledgeable on how to efficiently allocate campaign resources, and it 
makes them better known among voters and fundraisers. All this things may improve their 
probability of getting the seat in comparison with the newcomers. Then, those candidates 
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who decide to persist in running for office, including those who lost the seat, would have 
an advantage (Haime, Vallejo & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017; Anagol & Fujiwara, 2016).  
 
2.3.2 Candidate nomination process  
The second reason is the candidate nomination process. Each political party’s statute has 
the regulations for how the parties nominate candidates, which has to be consistent with 
the electoral code (Law 9,504/1997). For the four legislative offices in Brazil (Senate, 
National Chamber of Deputies, State Legislatures, and City Councils), all the parties have 
a decentralized system of nomination. This means that the candidates’ lists are generated 
at the district-level. In the case of the city council elections, lists are generated at the city 
level, with no meddling of the national or the state party authorities.7  
 
The Brazilian electoral code bans independent candidacies. All candidates must run on a 
political party list. However, party affiliation requirements are weak, in comparison with 
other countries. Party switching is a common practice in Brazilian Politics (Schmitt 1999; 
Desposato 2006) and party labels and party organizations have little value for Brazilian 
politicians (Samuels, 2008).  
 
In contrast with closed list systems like Argentina or single member districts like the U.S., 
district party leaders in Brazil do not have control over the nomination process. In the case 
                                                
7 The formal requisites for a candidature are: having the Brazilian citizenship, having 
more than 18 years old, literacy, having a legal address in the district where the candidate 
wants to run, not being banned by the electoral justice, and being able of the plenty 
exercise of political rights (this excludes people with sentence without possibility of 
appeal). 
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of Argentina, district party leaders hold a great authority in the candidate nomination 
process. District party leaders are the gatekeepers of the party, letting or not prospective 
candidates to enter or not in their lists (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, & Tommasi, 2001). In the 
U.S. district party leaders have also a relevant role by recruiting prospective candidates for 
primaries (Maisel and Stone, 1997, 1998; Krebs, 1999).  
 
In Brazil district party leaders have more discrete role. Some scholars have argued that 
party leaders and recruiters in Brazil do not play any relevant role during elections 
(Samuels, 2003; Mainwaring 1991). According to these scholars, the open list 
proportional representation system creates an environment where party leaders do not 
have a role. The more votes a party gets, the better for the party, regardless these votes 
come from one or many candidates. Therefore, parties do not have incentives to have 
gatekeepers of candidatures because each candidature represents, potentially, more votes.  
 
Contrastingly, a second group of scholars have argued that, despite the incentives of open 
list proportional representation, party leaders have an active role (Braga, 2008; Álvarez, 
2008; Braga & Amaral, 2013; Bolognesi, 2013). They argue that if the absence of 
gatekeeper is real we may observe candidates filling the 100% of the available slots of 
candidatures by party, but parties usually only fill between 40% and 50% of the available 
slots. These scholars have argued that party leaders have two main roles in Brazilian 
elections. First, they prevent extreme levels of intraparty competition that can affect the 
performance of a party as a whole in the election—minimizing incentives for candidates to 
perform negative campaigns against co-partisans for example (Cheibub & Sin, 2015). The 
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second role of party leaders is that they coordinate the selection of candidatures to fill the 
quota requisites of including female candidates to avoid getting penalized by the electoral 
justice (Araujo & Borges, 2012).  
 
Another group of scholars has focused on the variation of the party leaders’ attributions 
among parties (Braga, 2008; Amaral 2011). They found that leaders from more 
programmatic parties (like PT, the Workers Party) have a more active role in recruiting 
candidates and more authority to ban candidatures than leaders from less programmatic 
parties (like PMDB, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement).  
 
Despite these differences, there is an agreement that individual candidates in Brazil have 
large autonomy in deciding whether to run or not, and for which party label. This is a 
common characteristic for all legislative elections, including the elections for city council. 
And, in the unusual case of a nomination being denied by the party to a candidate, 
candidates can always opt for switching parties and running anyway. Then, self-selection 
is the main characteristic for the Brazilian candidate nomination process. 
 
2.3.3 Cost of an electoral campaign 
Running for office always implies monetary costs. These costs come mainly from the 
campaign. Electoral campaigns for city council are significatively cheaper than campaigns 
for other offices in Brazil. Campaign expenditure limits for City Council also vary 
according to the size of the city. For small cities (less than 50,000 voters, the 92.04% of 
the cities) the average limit for the 2016 elections was R$ 15,363.68 (4,011.40 dollars). 
  
30 
For medium cities (between 50,000 and 200,000 voters—6.30% of cities) the average 
limit was R$ 67,489.5 (17,621.28 dollars). For big cities (between 200,000 and 1,000,000 
voters, the 1.47% of the cities) the average limit was R$ 203,055.70 (53,017.15 dollars). 
Finally, for very big cities (more than 1,000,000 of voters, the 0.17% of the cities) the 
average limit was R$ 880,911.56 (230,003.02 dollars).  
 
The average campaign expenditures for a city council candidate in 2016 was R$ 22,968.28 
(5,996.94 dollars). For the same year the average campaign expenditures were R$ 
248,596.84 for mayor (64,907.79 dollars), and for the 2018 election, the average campaign 
expenditures were R$ 1,000,000 for state deputy (261,096.61 dollars), R$ 2,500,000 for 
federal deputy (652,741.5 dollars), R$ 3,248,148.3 for senator (848,080.5 dollars), R$ 
7,725,926 for governor (2,017,213 dollars) and R$ 70,000,000 for president 
(18,276,762.40 dollars).8 9  
 
As in many other countries, politics is an exclusive arena that a large portion of the 
population cannot access. However, for the portion of the population who has the 
conditions to run, the city council elections are cheapest alternative. Therefore, those 
                                                
8 Data available at http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-
2016/prestacao-de-contas/divulgacao-dos-limites-legais-de-campanha and 
http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-2018/prestacao-de-contas-1/limites-de-gastos-por-
cargo-eletivo-das-eleicoes-2018.  
9 In the cases of executive offices, candidates must get 50% of the votes to get elected; 
otherwise the two candidates with more votes run a second election with a new budget and 
limit for campaign expenditures. Then, there are two limits for campaign expenditures: 
one for the first and another for the second round. For these offices I just considered the 
limit in campaign expenditures for the first round.  
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people with nascent political ambition may consider start a political career from this 
office.  
 
2.3.4. The place where political careers start 
City Council elections are considered the place where a political career starts (Prinz, 1993; 
Dye, MacManus and Zooberg, 1969; Krebs, 1999). Particularly in Brazil, City Council 
elections offer the perfect political opportunity structure to start a political career. 
According to TSE, 92.45% of candidates who are running for their first time for a 
Brazilian elective office are doing so in City Council elections. 
 
However, the city council offices seen as the first stepping-stone for political careers. 
Table 2.3.4.A shows that more than 20% of candidates who ran for office between 2000 
and 2006 were candidates for City Council at some point in their careers.  This percentage 
varies according to the office in dispute. The range goes from 8.8% of candidates who ran 
for president, to 21.3% of candidates who ran for city council. Table 2.3.4.A also shows 
how many of those candidates won the office when he/she ran for the City Council.  
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Table 2.3.4.A: Number and percentage of candidates with previous experience running for 
City Council by office 
 
Running for 
No experience 
as CC candidate 
CC experience 
as candidate 
(but not elected) 
CC experience 
as candidate 
(and elected) Totals 
President 62 5 1 68 
(%) 91.2% 7.4% 1.5% 100% 
Governor 747 78 21 846 
(%) 88.3% 9.2% 2.5% 100% 
Senator 903 111 32 1,046 
(%) 86.3% 10.6% 3.1% 100% 
Federal Deputy 18,278 2,977 995 22,250 
(%) 82.1% 13.4% 4.5% 100% 
Mayor 64,793 3,213 7,370 75,376 
(%) 86.0% 4.3% 9.8% 100% 
State Deputy 46,451 7,570 2,909 56,930 
(%) 81.6% 13.3% 5.1% 100% 
City Council  1,344,393 257,654 105,734 1,707,781 
(%) 78.7% 15.1% 6.2% 100% 
Total 1,475,627 271,608 117,062 1,864,297 
(%) 79.2% 14.6% 6.3% 100% 
 
 
Therefore, looking at the first office where candidates decide to run is consistent with the 
main argument of this dissertation. This dissertation is a story about candidates who 
decide to throw their hat into the ring and, after facing the result of the election, decide to 
continue or not with their political career. If, as agued above, the City Council elections 
are the place where political careers start; they are also the first place where they can get 
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truncated. So they are the first place we should look at to understand who those candidates 
who decide to give up are. 
 
2.3.5. Female presence in ballots but not elected  
In contrast with the experience in many other countries, the adoption of gender quotas for 
legislative election in Brazil did not have successful results. Brazil adopted a gender quota 
law for al legislative offices in 1997 (Law 9,504/1997). That text mandated that political 
parties must reserve a minimum of 30% of their legislative candidate list for each gender. 
The same law also established that parties were allowed to present a maximum number of 
candidates up to 150% of the total of seats at stake in the district, and 200% in the cases 
where the party was in an electoral coalition with other(s) party(ies). Given this excessive 
provision, the requirement of reserved seats only indicated that parties could not run a full 
slate of male candidates. But if they did not fill all the allocated female candidacies, they 
could run an election with just male candidates, as long as those candidacies did not 
occupy the seats reserved for women. For example, in a legislative election in a district 
with ten seats at stake parties can present up to 15 candidates. The requirement of the 30% 
of the seats reserved for women mandates that no more than 70% of the 15 candidates can 
be men (Wylie and dos Santos, 2016). Consequently, under the first version of gender 
quotas it was legal that in a district with ten seats at stake a party presents just 10 male 
candidates and no women, leaving vacant the other 5 reserved seats. 
 
The initial quota law did not have the effect of increasing the number of female candidates 
or female representatives in legislative bodies. The reform that made quotas work took 
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place in 2009, when president Lula da Silva formed a Tripartite Commission, with 
representatives from the executive and legislative branches, and members of the civic 
society to discuss and propose changes in order to improve women’s representation in 
legislatures. The law 12,034/2009 was passed on September of 2009 and it included one 
big modification in the text of the quota law: the word “reserve” (reserva) was replace 
with “fill” (preencher). That meant that not occupying the reserved seats for the other 
gender was not enough anymore. Now, parties must have at least 30% of candidate from 
each gender (Wylie and dos Santos, 2016).  
 
Although the 2009 reform was successful in increasing the percentage female candidates 
running for office, the percentage of women elected was still very low. Figure 3.5.A 
shows the percentage of women running and getting elected for each office from 1994 to 
2016 Vertical dashed lines indicate the adoption of gender quotas in 1997, and the 
posterior reform in 2009.10 For the office of Senator, the reform of quotas changed from 
10.5% in 2006 to 12.5% in 2010 the percentage of women running for office, and from 
12.5% to 13.2% the percentage of women elected. For the office of Federal Deputy, the 
immediate elections before and after the reform of gender quotas changed for the women 
running for that office from 13.2% in 2006 to 19.7% in 2010, and from 8.3% to 7.2% for 
the women elected, for the same years. Then, for the office of State Deputy the percentage 
of women running for office in the immediate election before the adoption of quotas 
changed from 14.7% in 2006 to 21.1% in 2010, while the percentage of women elected in 
                                                
10 All legislative elections are held every four years. Elections for Senator, Federal Deputy 
and State deputy were held in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014, concurrent with 
presidential and governmental elections, while elections for city council took place in 
1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, concurrent with mayoral elections. 
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the same two elections went from 11.1% to 12%. Finally, for the City Council office the 
percentage of women running for office went from 22.7% in 2008 to 33.1% in 2012 while 
the percentage of women elected went from 12.5% to 13.2%, for the same elections. 
Overall, the 1997 adoption of quotas had little positive impact on the percentage of 
women running for office and no impact on the percentage of women elected. The 2009 
reform had a larger impact on the percentage of women running for office, which sharply 
increased, but it hardly changed the percentage of women who got elected.   
 
Figure 2.3.5.A: Impact of gender quotas on women running and elected in Brazil 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral (TSE).  
 
In sum, Gender quotas in Brazil created an institutional incentive to increase the number 
of women running, but these institutions were not effective in improving gender 
representation. Brazil offers a case to study where voters have the chance to make women 
getting electing, but it is not happening. In contrast with the U.S. where women are not 
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getting elected because they do not run (Fox & Lawless, 2010; Sapiro, 1982), in Brazil 
women are not getting elected despite the fact that they are running for office. For this 
research perspective, the Brazilian city council elections offers a case with enough men 
and women running for office to analyze their patterns of candidate persistence. 
 
2.3.6. Gender-role socialization and political ambitions in Brazil 
My theoretical model lies on the assumption that differences in political ambitions across 
gender are the result of long-standing patterns of traditional sex role socialization. As 
defined by Conover and Gray, traditional sex role socialization is the “division of 
activities into the public extra-familial jobs done by the male and the private intra-familial 
ones performed by the female” (1983, 2-3). This division produces social stereotypes for 
each gender, creating a role related to house and children for women, and a role related to 
jobs and political activities for men. As a result of this process, women perceive 
themselves as less qualified for activities which are considered a “man’s business,” than 
men with equal qualifications—and running for office is one of these cases. Consequently, 
many qualified women are not running for office because they do not feel they are good 
enough, and as a result women are poorly represented in elective political offices (Fox and 
Lawless, 2010). 
 
This argument, which connects the traditional process of socialization, gender differences 
in political ambition, and a low percentage of women being elected in political offices, has 
been documented and tested in the United States. For that reason, in order to argue for the 
presence of a similar process in Brazil, it is necessary to analyze empirical evidence. I 
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argue that these patterns of traditional socialization and the subsequent gap on ambitions 
exist in Brazil, at least with the same intensity as in the U.S. There are three 
manifestations of socialization that explain the gender gap in political ambition described 
in the American Politics literature: traditional family role orientations, masculinized 
ethos, and gendered psyche. I proceed by describing them and providing evidence of the 
presence of these three characteristics in Brazil.  
 
2.3.6.1. Traditional Family Role Orientations 
The most obvious manifestations of traditional gender socialization are family roles. 
Family roles are one of the biggest obstacles women face when trying to pursue a political 
career, but they also affect women in business (Mardsen, Kalleberg & Cook, 1993, Arráiz, 
2018) and academic positions (O’Laughlin & Bischoff, 2005). Even nowadays, in most 
countries there is a social expectation for women to prioritize household and childcare 
over their political career (Poortman & Tanja Van Der Lippe, 2009; Silverman, 2015). 
One way to observe this is by looking at the social distribution of unpaid jobs. For all 
countries, even the most developed and progressive, women perform larger portions of 
unpaid jobs than men. This affects women’s political ambitions by creating obstacles for 
them to balance a political career with their household and family duties. For many 
women, a political career represents a third job together with their family and household 
obligations. In contrast, their male counterparts spend less time at the house, which gives 
them an advantage when pursuing a political career (Lawless and Fox, 2010, 10). 
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Figure 3.6.1.A presents the amount of paid and unpaid job, which includes household and 
childcare, in the OECD and the CEPAL countries, by gender11. Both types of jobs are 
measured as the total minutes on average people spend per day. As the figure shows there 
is a gender gap in the amount of time spend on paid and unpaid jobs. For all OECD and 
CEPAL countries, women are responsible for the majority of unpaid jobs. The mean of the 
paid job for men is 327.8 minutes a day, with a standard deviation of 47.7 minutes. In the 
case of women, the mean of the paid job is 196.94 minutes, with a standard deviation of 
39.2. The difference of means in paid jobs is 130.86 minutes in favor of men. In contrary, 
the mean of the unpaid job for men is 131.8 minutes, with a standard difference of 38.9. 
Then, for women the mean is 289.5 minutes, with standard deviation of 61.1. When 
calculating the difference we find that women spend 157.7 minutes more than men doing 
unpaid jobs. For the United States the bullets are highlighted in the Figure 2.3.6.1.A. 
American men spend 80.5 minutes more working on remunerated job than women per day 
(322.4 against 241.9 minutes). While for unpaid jobs, women spend 93.5 minutes more 
than men per day (242.1 against 148.6), showing an uneven distribution of paid and 
unpaid jobs. 
 
                                                
11 Data refer to the latest available year. For OECD; Australia: 2006; Austria: 2008-09; 
Belgium: 2005; Canada:  2010; China: 2008; Denmark: 2001; Estonia: 2009-10; Finland: 
2009-10; France: 2009; Germany: 2001-02; Hungary:  1999-2000; India: 1999; Italy: 
2008-09; Ireland: 2005; Japan: 2011; Korea: 2009; the Netherlands:  2005-06; New 
Zealand: 2009-10; Norway: 2010; Poland: 2003-04; Portugal: 1999; Slovenia: 2000-01; 
South Africa:  2010; Spain: 2009-10; Sweden: 2010; Turkey: 2006; the United Kingdom: 
2005; and the United States: 2014. For CEPAL; Argentina: 2013; Brazil: 2012; Chile: 
2015; Colombia: 2012; Costa Rica: 2011; Ecuador: 2012; El Salvador: 2010; Guatemala: 
2014; Honduras: 2009; Mexico: 2014; Panama: 2016; Peru: 2010; and Uruguay: 2013. 
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Figure 2.3.6.1.A: Paid and unpaid job by gender in OECD and CEPAL countries 
 
 
Latin America was not the exception to this gender division of jobs. In Latin America 
gender traditional roles are well defined. In her seminal book about the role of women in 
society in Latin America, Elsa Chaney documented with survey data that for Latin 
American women “home and family come first, even for professionals who have worked 
all their lives” (1979, p.34). Until recent years, but still present in many areas of Latin 
America, a woman’s place was in the home. Most Latin American women who work do 
so just out of economic necessity. For the case of Brazil, Blachman has argued that 
Brazilians generally agreed that men and women may have different type of jobs (1973, 
cited from Chaney, 1979, p.34). Bullets for Brazil are also highlighted in Figure 3.6.1.A. 
For this country, women spend 151.2 more minutes than men, per day, doing unpaid work 
(201.9 against 50.6 minutes); and men outpace women in paid work by doing 147 minutes 
every day (317.4 against 170 minutes). As in the U.S., there is an uneven distribution of 
jobs.  
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The Euclidean distance, i.e. the straight-line distance, between two points in a multi 
dimensional space, can tell us in which case the observations are more distant (Ozimek & 
Miles, 2011). In other words, we are going to calculate the distance between American 
males and American women and the distance between Brazilian men and Brazilian 
women, in a bi-dimensional space of paid and unpaid jobs. The larger the distance, the 
more unequal a country is in terms of time spent on paid and unpaid jobs between men 
and women.  
 
The Euclidean distance between American men and women is 123.3 minutes while, for 
Brazilian the distance between men and women is 210.9 minutes. Therefore, the division 
of paid and unpaid jobs between men and women is more unequal in Brazil than in the 
United States. Consequently, we have evidence, which supports the explanation that 
traditional family role orientations, present in the United States, are also present, and 
maybe they are stronger, in Brazil.  
 
To sum up, traditional family orientations are the first manifestation of the process of 
socialization that ends up creating a gender gap in political ambitions between men and 
women. One way to see this manifestation is looking at the division of jobs inside a 
society. We have shown that the pattern that exists in America (Lawless and Fox 2005), is 
also present in Brazil.  
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2.3.6.2. Masculinized Ethos 
A second manifestation of the process of socialization is a masculinized ethos. The 
masculinized ethos refers to the degree in which political institutions are dominantly 
associated with males. When institutions are historically performed by men so often that 
the institution becomes associated with them, we can talk about a masculinized ethos. 
Therefore, this masculinized ethos makes women less likely to run for office and 
consequently fewer women get the seats—reinforcing the ethos. For example, in America, 
the presidency is an institution with a masculinized ethos. In 242 years of democracy a 
woman never occupied the presidency in the U.S. and in 2016 Hillary Clinton was the first 
woman to win the nomination of one of the major political parties for presidency.  
 
The scenario for female politicians in Latin America is a just bit better. For the case of 
Brazil, Dilma Rousseff was elected president in 2010 with over 56 of the votes in the run-
off, re-elected in 2014 with over 51%. Other cases of women reaching presidencies in 
Latin America are Lidia Gueiler president of Bolivia between 1979 and 1980; Violeta 
Chamorro, president of Nicaragua between 1990 and 1997; Cristina Fernandez in 
Argentina from 2007 to 2015; Rosalia Arteaga in Ecuador in 1997; Mireyra Moscoso, 
elected president of Panamá in 1999, and serving till 2004; Michelle Bachellet, president 
of Chile from 2006 to 2010 and from 2014 to march of 2018; and Laura Chinchilla, 
president of Costa Rica from 2010 to 2014.  
 
However, despite the eight cases of women who reached Latin American presidencies 
shown in the previous paragraph, the presidential office, as well as most offices in Latin 
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America, is highly masculinized. For the U.S. and for Brazil two of the most important 
offices after the presidency are the governorships and the national deputy.12 Figure 3.6.2.A 
shows the percentage of national deputies and governorships hold by women from 1986 to 
2015 for the U.S. and Brazil.13 During this period, the United States always had at least 
one female governor. For all the years of the period the U.S. had at least one woman 
occupying the governorship, and its average is 8.76%. Then, for Brazil the first women 
who occupied a governorship was Iolanda Fleming from May of 1986 to March of 1987, 
after being elected vice-governor of the State of Acre and governor Nabor Junior leaving 
the office to run for mayor in 1986. Since 1995 to 2015, at least one Brazilian woman 
worked as Governor. The mean in the percentage of women in governorship for the whole 
period in Brazil is 5.22%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 In the cases of Brazil, governorship is clearly the second most prestigious office after 
the presidency. In the case of the United States, the Senator is in general considered as the 
second most prestigious office, being the Governor the third one. National deputies rank 
third in both countries, after the Senator and the Governor, respectively.  
13 Governorships are elected in both countries using majoritarian electoral rules (simple 
majority for U.S. and absolute majority for Brazil). Federal Deputies are elected under 
single member district in U.S., and open list proportional representation in Brazil. 
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Figure 2.3.6.2.A: Female National Deputies and Governors 
in the U.S. and Brazil (%): 1986-2015 
 
 
Regarding the office of National Deputy, the U.S. offers a consistent and increasing 
pattern of women in the Lower Chamber. The minimum value was 4.9% for 1987, and the 
maximum was 19.4 for 2015 and 2017. The mean value during the entire period was 
13.6% for the U.S. In the case of Brazil, the pattern was more irregular. The minimum 
value was 5.3% for 1998 and the maximum was 9.9% for 2014, while the mean value for 
the entire period was 7.4%. With the exception of 1986, the U.S. had a larger percentage 
of women in the lower chamber than Brazil for the entire period. 14 
 
                                                
14 Percentages of figures 2.3.6.2.A 2.3.5.A cab be slightly different because for figure 
3.5.A data came from TSE and it reflects the percentage of women elected; while for 
Figure 3.6.2.A data came from IPU and shows the percentage of women who occupied the 
seat. Differences between the percentage of women elected and women who occupied the 
seat at the Brazilian lower house may reflect party negotiations, candidates who decided 
not to occupy the seat because they receive a better offer (like a portfolio), or just 
abdications. 
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In conclusion, the second manifestation of a socialization process is when the ethos of a 
political institution is highly masculinized, i.e. when political institutions are seen as part 
of a man’s world. In this section we compared two institutions in two countries: the lower 
chamber and the governorships in Brazil and in the U.S. Despite the fact that the U.S. is a 
country with a poor female representation in these two institutions, it has done better than 
Brazil. Therefore, we have some empirical evidence to argue that the ethos of political 
institutions in Brazil is masculinized.  
 
2.3.6.3 Gendered Psyche 
Finally, the third manifestation of the traditional gender socialization process is a gendered 
psyche. Once the family roles are differentiated by gender and the political institutions are 
clearly dominated by men, traditional socialization culminates in the emergence of a 
gendered psyche that makes women accept these terms of socialization. When women try 
to “play” in a field that it is not the “appropriate” according to their socialization, they feel 
outside their comfort zone. Consequently, women tend to think that they are not good 
enough to compete in politics, in comparison with males with same qualifications. 
 
Some studies have shown how this traditional socialization process affects the 
psychological development with effects on the desire of achievement, risk aversion, and 
self-confidence. In a seminal paper on gender differences, Eccles (1987) argues that 
professional achievement-related decisions are a product of the individuals’ perceptions 
about the expected success. Controlling for abilities, Moebius et al (2011) have shown that 
women don’t consider themselves confident enough to enter into competitive 
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environments when compared to men. Therefore, fewer women are deciding to run (or to 
re-run) for office because they think politics is a hostile territory for women, and they do 
not feel confident enough to do it. Eckel and Grossman (2008) review most of the studies 
about gender differences in risk aversion and find consistent evidence for women to be 
more risk adverse then men in both, field and laboratory studies.  
 
Therefore, if women have a lower desire for professional achievement, because they are 
more adverse to risk and if they feel less confident than men, we may observe fewer 
women playing in arenas that require taking risk. In other words, we will see fewer 
women running for office and getting the seats because they do not feel that they are 
qualified enough for the office. Figure 3.6.3.A shows the results of an attitudinal question 
toward women form World Value Survey. Surveyed participants were asked “On the 
whole, men make better political leaders than women do”, and they have to answer in a 
scale of four options that goes from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The results in 
Figure 3.6.3.A correspond just to American and Brazilian women (men where excluded 
from the data). In the U.S., 12.05% of the women’s respondents agreed with the statement, 
while 2.64% strongly agreed with it. In Brazil 18.09% of the respondents agreed, while 
5.35% of the female respondents strongly agreed with the statement. The sum of women 
that agree and strongly agree with the statement “men make better political leaders than 
women do” is lower in the United States (14.59%) than in Brazil (23.44%). Then, 
consequently the sum of the percentages of women that disagree and strongly disagree is 
bigger in the U.S. (85.31%) than Brazil (76.56%). Therefore, we can conclude that we 
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have some evidence to think that there is a gendered psyche in Brazil which may affect 
women’s political ambition. 
 
Figure 2.3.6.3.A: Attitudes toward women:  
“Men make better political leaders than women do” (%) 
 
 
Through the previous paragraphs I presented the last manifestation of the traditional sex 
role socialization: the gendered psyche. This last manifestation was defined as the 
acceptance of women of the process of socialization that excludes women from politics, 
relegating them to housework and child growth. I also have shown evidence from the U.S. 
and Brazil about women’s attitudes toward women in politics. Using data from World 
Values Survey I showed that women in Brazil have a more negative attitude toward 
women’s participation in politics than women in the United States. 
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2.3.6.4 Summary 
To conclude this discussion, we can say that the evidence supports the presence of a 
pattern of traditional sex role socialization in Brazil with stronger magnitude than in the 
U.S. In the American Politics literature, this socialization process is considered the main 
reason of a gender gap in political ambitions (Fox and Lawless, 2010). We compared the 
three manifestations of it, traditional family role orientations, masculinized ethos, and 
gendered psyche, and we find that they exist in Brazil with more intensity than in the U.S. 
This evidence allows us to think in a gender gap in political ambition for Brazil.  
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Chapter 3: The effect of losing an election on 
political ambition 
 
How does losing an election affect political ambition? Do men and women react to an 
electoral setback in the same way? In this chapter I test the gender differences on the 
effect of losing an election on political ambition. I use candidate persistence, defined as 
the probability of running for office in following elections, as the measure of political 
ambition. Using data from city council elections in Brazil from 2000 to 2016 I test to see 
whether electoral setbacks affect political ambition differently for men and women.  
 
The analysis is divided in two parts. First, I run a regression discontinuity design to test 
whether a change in political ambition is causally attributable to losing the election. RDD 
exploits the fact that candidates cannot fully control the number of votes they get. By 
looking at candidates who barely won/lost, the treatment, losing an election, can be 
considered as randomly assigned. To account for gender differences I interact losing an 
election with gender, and I also calculate the difference in the effect of losing on political 
ambition between genders. Second, I run a multivariate ordinal logistic analysis where I 
predict the probability of running for the same or higher offices, conditional on the result 
of the election and gender. In both analyses I find that, despite the fact that losing an 
election has a negative effect on candidate persistence for both, men and women, the 
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effect is stronger for women. These results suggest that women are less likely than men to 
persist running for office after experiencing an electoral setback.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the hypothesis for this chapter and the 
data of Brazilian municipal elections used for both analyses. Then, I describe the research 
design for the regression discontinuity and the results of the analysis. For the ordinal 
logistic model, I proceed by describing the variables and then presenting the results. 
Finally, I summarize the conclusion of both analyses.  
 
3.1 The effect of losing 
In the previous chapter I provide the theoretical arguments to expect a gender gap on the 
effect of losing an election on political ambition. I argued that women might be more 
sensitive to an electoral setback because the gender differences on their perception about 
their skills as candidates. Women have a lower self-perception about their skills as 
candidates when compared to males with same qualifications. I also argued that losing an 
election might reduce political ambition. Joining these two arguments, I claimed that the 
psychological effect of losing on those individuals with lower consideration about their 
skills as candidates—women—would be stronger than the effect on individuals with 
higher consideration—men—(Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless 2012). Consequently, my 
hypothesis 1 is: 
 
H1: After an electoral setback, women are less likely than men to persist running for 
office 
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3.2 The data 
For this chapter I use data on Brazilian City Council elections from 2000 to 2016 from 
Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral. City council elections in Brazil are held every four years, 
concurrently with the mayoral elections. Table 3.2.A presents the total of observations by 
year and the percentage of candidates elected by gender. In total data have 1,080,754 
observations.   
 
The 2012 election presents more candidates than the previous elections for two 
institutional changes in the elections. The first institutional change is the 2009 reform of 
gender quotas. After the reform, parties must include women in their ballots but they do 
not necessarily have to replace men for women. Parties can nominate up to 1.5 times as 
many candidates relative to the seat at stake. Therefore, those parties that did not fill the 
maximum number of nominations can include women without replacing the males. The 
second reform is the increase in the number of municipalities from 5,356 to 5,570, which 
naturally increased the number of candidates running.15 
 
                                                
15 http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2013/06/cresce-numero-de-municipios-
no-brasil-em-2013 and http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2010/12/em-67-anos-brasil-
criou-3990-municipios-aponta-atlas-do-ibge.html. 
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Table 3.2.A: Candidates by year, gender and result of election16 
Election 
Year 
Women Men  
Lost Won Lost Won Total 
2000 49,796 4,574 180,390 34,749 269,509 
 18.48% 1.70% 66.93% 12.89%  
2004 50,481 4,265 154,188 30,026 238,960 
 21.13% 1.78% 64.52% 12.57%  
2008 49,982 4,484 153,726 31,389 239,581 
 20.86% 1.87% 64.16% 13.10%  
2012 104,694 5,277 187,368 35,365 332,704 
 31.47% 1.59% 56.32% 10.63%  
Total 254,954 18,600 675,675 131,529 1,080,754 	 23.59% 1.72% 62.52% 12.17% 	 
 
For all years, 74.69% of the candidates were males, and just 25.31% were females. The 
trend changes after the reform of gender quotas in 2009 for the 2012 election, where 
women held 33.06% of the candidatures. On average for all the election years, 86.11% of 
the candidates lost the seat, 72.6% of them were males, and just 27.4% were females.  
 
3.3 Analysis I: Regression discontinuity design 
For the first part of the analysis I examine the effect of losing an election on candidate 
persistence by gender using a regression discontinuity design, which exploits the fact that 
candidates cannot fully control how many votes they receive in an election. Though losing 
                                                
16 Despite my data goes from 2000 to 2016, the 2016 election was excluded from the 
analysis because of the way I am coding the dependent variable: whether running or not in 
the following election and for which office. I used the 2016 election to code candidate 
persistence for the 2012 candidates, but then 2016 was dropped from the analysis because 
data of the two following elections (2018 and 2020) do not exist at the moment of running 
the analysis. 
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an election is conditioned on institutional and political factors, the precise total number of 
votes is subject to a “nontrivial random component”. In most of electoral scenarios, 
whether a candidate barely wins or barely loses a seat can be viewed as if it were a random 
event, which allows the estimation of a causal effect of the electoral result.  
 
The dependent variable is candidate persistence17, coded 1 for those candidates who re-run 
for any office in the following election, and 0 for those who do not. For the analysis, I 
adopt the RD design to the open list proportional representation system used in Brazil for 
the Chamber of City Council elections from 2000 to 2016.18 Though voters in Brazil can 
choose to vote for candidates or for the parties, most of the time they vote for candidates 
(Samuels, 1999). For example, in the 2010 election for federal deputy, 90.8% of the votes 
were casted for candidates (O’ Globo, 2017), and proportions are similar for other 
legislative offices. Votes for candidates and for parties from the same electoral coalition 
and are added to the same coalition’s total. The seats are distributed to the electoral 
coalitions proportionally with the percentage of votes obtained by the coalition’s total. The 
adjudication of seats among candidates responds to a ranking resulting from the amount of 
votes each individual candidate got in the election. So, if Coalition A gets N seats in an 
election for federal deputy, the N first candidates from Coalition A with the most votes are 
those getting the seats. Thus, since I am interested in the effect of a personal electoral 
victory/defeat on a candidate’s persistence, I will focus on the inter-coalition seat 
allocation, which determines if a candidate win or lose the seat.  
                                                
17 A codebook with the description of all variables can be found in the Appendix. 
18 I follow the adoption of RDD for open list system done by Boas, Richardson and 
Hidalgo (2014). 
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Formally, a coalition ! wins !! seats. Let ! be the intra-coialition ranks for each candidate, 
determined by !!", the total number of votes a candidate from coalition ! gets. The 
candidates with ! ≤ !! win	the	office,	while	those	with	! > !! 	lose	it.	For	each	electoral	coalition,	the	candidate	with	! = !! 	is	the	“last	winner”,	whose	total	votes	are	!! =!!" . Then, the candidate with !!!! is the	“first	loser”,	whose	vote	total	is	denoted	as	!! = ! + 1.	Let	!!" 	be	candidate	!’s	margin	of	votes	of	victory	or	of	defeat,	and	define	it	as:	
!!" =  !! = !!" − !!!!            !" ! ≤ !!!! = !!" −  !!           !" ! > !!  
 
The margin of votes for a candidate who won a seat will be her vote total minus the vote 
total of the first loser, which will yield a positive value. The margin of votes for a 
candidate who lost the seat will be her vote total minus the vote total of the last winner, 
giving, by definition, a negative value. Thus, the outcome of each election is given by the 
margin of votes: !!" = 1 if  !!" < 0, and !!" = 0 if  !!" > 0, where ! is a binary variable 
coded 1 for those candidates who lost the election, and 0 for those who won.  
 
The main interest in the analysis is not the discontinuity itself—that is, the effect of losing 
an election on the likelihood of running again for a seat during the period under study.  
Instead, I focus on the gender difference in the discontinuity—that is, the difference 
between men and women in the effect of losing an election on the likelihood to running 
for office. In other words, the null hypothesis of the analysis would not be the absence of a 
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negative effect of losing on candidate persistence, but the absence of a gender difference 
in the effect of losing on candidate persistence. Formally, I estimate the following 
equation: !!" = ! + !!!!" + !!!!" + !!!!" ∙ !!" + ! !!" + ! !!" ∙ !!" + ! !!" ∙ !!" + ! !!" ∙ !!" ∙ !!" + !!" 
 
where ! is a binary indicator of candidate persistence, i.e. re-running in the two following 
elections ! + 1; L is a binary indicator for losing the seat in election !; ! is a binary 
indicator for being female; and !(!) is a polynomial function of the distance between the 
percentage of votes gained by a candidate ranked ! to the first loser/last winner of coalition !.19  
 
For the RDD analysis, candidate persistence was coded 1 in t for those candidates who ran 
for any office in t+1, where t+1 could be any of the two posterior elections to t, and 0 
otherwise. I used the two posterior elections because elections are held in Brazil every two 
years. All national and state elections are held every four years (2002, 2006, 2010 and 
                                                
19 It could be argued that the difference in political ambition between losers and winners is 
not the product of a negative effect of losing but of a positive effect of winning. In this 
dissertation I would argue that the change in ambition is product of the effect of losing 
because the analysis focused just in candidates. Candidates are a self-selected group of 
people who had enough political ambition to run for office in the first place. Ceteris 
paribus, the result of the election may affect that initial political ambition positively if they 
won and negatively if they lost. A positive update on their political ambition would make 
candidates, who were ambitious enough to run for office, even more politically ambitious. 
In contrary, a negative update for losing the election would move down the initial level of 
political ambition, sometimes below the minimum threshold necessary to run for office. A 
binary outcome, such as candidate persistence, is able capture the negative changes in 
political ambition, which moves a candidates’ political ambition below the minimum 
thresholds to run for office. Despite it may be an effect of winning, it’s not possible to 
capture it with a binary outcome.  
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2014 in my dataset). Municipal elections are also held every four years but non-
concurrently with the national and state election (2000, 2004, 2008 2012 and 2016 in my 
dataset). Consequently, looking at the two posterior elections from t covers all the possible 
offices where a candidate could run.  
 
The data I for this analysis is not perfectly balanced for two reasons. The first reason is the 
nature of open list proportional representation elections. As described in the previous 
chapter, party leaders do not have a large role in the nomination as gatekeepers. Even in 
the case where party leaders could ban an aspiring candidate to run for their parties, 
aspiring candidates can get the nomination and run for a different party. Moreover, parties 
can nominate up to 50% more candidates than seats at stake in each district. For example, 
if there are 10 seats at stake, each party can present up to 15 candidates. Consequently, 
there are going to be more candidates running and losing (the treatment group) than 
running and winning (the control group) in my dataset. Despite the skewness of the data it 
is not possible to argue that the observation deliberately chose to be in the control 
(winners) or the treatment group (losers) group (McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo, Jansson & Ma, 
2017).  The theoretical implication of a manipulation around the cutoff would be that each 
candidate is deliberately deciding to win or to lose the elections. That would not be the 
case of elections, where all candidates look forward to being elected. Then, despite the 
fact that results of data on the conventional tests for manipulation show that manipulation 
cannot be discarded, the skewness does respond to the nature of open list elections.  
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The second problem with the data is related with the gap on gender representation in an 
open list system. Regardless of the introduction of gender quotas, open list proportional 
representation has shown to not be a friendly electoral system for female candidates (Jones 
& Navia, 1999; Schmidt, 2003). There are more males than females between competitive 
candidates. Consequently, the data show more men than women at both sides of the 
discontinuity. This issue is more visible in the subgroup of women who were elected.  
 
Skewness and the smaller number of women than men in the data could also result in 
larger confidence intervals, particularly for the estimations that include women winning 
the seat. Figure 3.3.A displays a histogram of the running variable around the cutoff for 
the four samples. Histograms show the unbalances in the data mentioned above. A way to 
solve this problem could be enlarging the margins of the analysis. However, by enlarging 
the margins the design could fail for including observations that can be considered as not 
randomly treated. For that reason I report the results in four samples of the dataset which 
refers to four distances from the cutoff. First, .09%, which represents the 5th percentile; 
second, .17%, which represents the 10th percentile; then, .2%, which is the 12th 
percentile; and finally, .25%, which is equal to the 15th percentile.20  
                                                
20 Since the reform of 2009 several party leaders have filled the requirements of the quota 
for women in their party lists by including non-competitive women in their ballots. These 
candidates receive the name of mulheres laranjas or candidatas laranjas, meaning fake 
women or fake female candidates, respectively. Mulheres laranjas receive from zero to a 
few of votes, finishing far away from winning a seat. 
 
Despite there is no clear evidence about how do party leaders recruit these candidates, the 
presence of this type of candidates could affect systematically my results. Some 
newspaper articles suggested that party recruiters use always the same list of fake female 
candidates by the elections. Other newspaper articles suggest that party recruiters change 
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Figure 3.3.A Histogram of running variable (margin of victory/defeat) 
 
 
3.3.1 Results 
Figures 3.3.1.A and 3.3.1.B present regression discontinuity graphs for men and women 
using linear and polynomial approaches.  Figure 3.3.1.A uses the first 5th percentile of the 
observations closer to the cutoff (0.09% around the bandwidth), while Figure 3.3.1.B uses 
the first 15th percentile of the observations (0.17% around the bandwidth).21 Colored areas 
represent 95% confidence intervals, while markers show where observations are 
                                                                                                                                             
the list of fake female candidates to complete their ballots from one election to the other. 
In both cases, the estimation of my models could be affected by this behavior. If the fake 
females were always the same, I would have a fakely positive estimation for women who 
lost elections on candidate persistence. Instead, if party leaders were rotating the female 
candidates the use to fill the quota, my estimation would be fakely negative. Since for this 
study the design is a regression discontinuity at the margins of the cutoff, which divides 
winners and loser, this type of candidatures may not bias the estimations.  
21 To avoid overfitting, I use a linear approach for small bandwidths.  
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concentrated. Both graphs show a discontinuity between losing and winning a seat on 
candidate persistence, regardless the gender of candidates. However, when we compare 
the gender among losers/winners, the gender gap between those who lost is larger than the 
gap between those candidates who got elected.  
 
Figures 3.3.1.C and 3.3.1.D shows the OLS estimates of the discontinuity corresponding 
to Figures 3.3.1.A and 3.3.1.B respectively. Figure 3.3.1.C uses a linear approach and the 
maximum value in the bandwidth is 0.09%, while Figure 3.3.1.D uses a quadratic 
approach and the maximum value in the bandwidth is 0.17%. Spikes show 95% 
confidence intervals. Each figure presents results for men and women, and gender 
difference are presented separately. For both figures, the men and women estimations 
show the difference in candidate persistence between a man/woman who got elected and a 
candidate who didn’t win the seat at a same value in bandwidth. Similar to the Figures 
3.3.1.A and 3.3.1.B, losing an election has a negative effect on both, men and women.22  
The Gender Difference estimation (difference in difference) shows the differences 
between the estimation of men and women at different values of bandwidth. For the linear 
estimation, Figure 3.3.1.C, the difference shows statistical significance from the 
bandwidth value .055%. Then, for the quadratic model, Figure 3.3.1.D the statistical 
significant difference starts at the bandwidth value 0.096%. The lack of statistical 
significance at smaller values could be due to the small number of women at small 
intervals around the cutoff.  
                                                
22 In the case of women, although he effect is always negative, for small values of 
bandwidth, confidence intervals are overlapped with 0, due the small number of 
observations.  
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Table 3.3.1.A presents the results for the regression discontinuity and the difference in 
difference analysis. Models 1 to 4 show the results of interactive models at different 
bandwidths. Models 5 to 8 show the results at different bandwidths controlling for a linear 
polynomial. Finally, models 9 to 12 present the results controlling for a quadratic 
polynomial at the different bandwidths. With the exception of Model 5 for the effect of 
losing, the other eleven models show statistical significance in the expected direction for 
the three variables—Female (women=1), Losing (lost the seat in t=1), and the 
interaction—.  
 
Two conclusions can be made based on the results. First, there is a negative causal effect 
attributable to losing an election on candidate persistence. For both genders, losing an 
election substantially diminishes their probability to run in the following elections. 
Second, this causal effect of losing is larger for women than for men. That means that the 
negative effect of losing an election on my measure of political ambition, candidate 
persistence, is significantly larger for women. 
 
In conclusion, the regression discontinuity design shows supportive evidence for 
hypothesis 1: there are gender differences in the effect of losing an election on candidate 
persistence. Both, the linear and the quadratic approaches presented similar results. 
Results were also consistent at different bandwidths. For the next section I address the 
same question using an ordinal logistic model which allows me to control for potential 
covariates.  
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  Table 3.3.1.A: Regression discontinuity results 
Bandwidth -/+ .09% -/+ .17% -/+ .2% -/+ .25% 
Percentile 5th 10th 12th 15th 
Difference in difference 
  Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Female 
-0.140*** -0.183*** -0.196*** -0.214*** 
(0.00478) (0.00348) (0.00321) (0.00291) 
Losing 
-0.0363*** -0.0294*** -0.0335*** -0.0370*** 
(0.0108) (0.00811) (0.00755) (0.00694) 
Female x Losing 
-0.263*** -0.300*** -0.311*** -0.329*** 
(0.00803) (0.00538) (0.00486) (0.00428) 
First-order polynomial 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female 
-0.102*** -0.0959*** -0.101*** -0.107*** 
(0.00968) (0.00693) (0.00636) (0.00574) 
Losing 
-0.0346 -0.0408** -0.0310** -0.0259* 
(0.0221) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0133) 
Female x Losing 
-0.221*** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.230*** 
(0.017) (0.0116) (0.0105) (0.00929) 
Second-order polynomial 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Female 
-0.0997*** -0.105*** -0.0969*** -0.0939*** 
(0.0153) (0.0107) (0.00974) (0.00876) 
Losing 
-0.0703* -0.0468* -0.0535** -0.0489** 
(0.0359) (0.0246) (0.0224) (0.0202) 
Female x Losing 
-0.215*** -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.224*** 
(0.0274) (0.0184) (0.0166) (0.0148) 
Observations 52371 106428 128051 160481 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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3.4 Analysis II: Ordinal logistic analysis  
In this second analysis I address the gender gap in political ambition measured as 
candidate persistence from a different approach. I conduct a multivariate ordinal logistic 
analysis at different margins from the cutoff. This analysis complements the regression 
discontinuity for two reasons. First, the dependent variable is coded in a way that 
differentiates running for the same office from running for a higher office in the 
following election. Second, the analysis is controled for a battery of potential covariates 
that could be explaining the probability of running in the following election.  
 
As in the regression discontinuity analysis, I am looking at the gender difference in the 
effect of losing an election. Formally, I am estimating: !! = ! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!! ∙ !! + !! + !! 
 
where Y is an ordinal indicator of candidate persistence for the same or higher ranked 
office in t+ 1; L is a binary indicator for losing the seat in election t; F is a binary 
indicator for the sex of the candidate; and ! is a battery of controls. 
 
The dependent variable of this analysis is candidate persistence (Y), coded 0 for those 
candidates who ran for the city council office at t but they did not run for any office at 
t+1, 1 for those candidate who ran for city council at t and they ran for the same office at 
t+1 (candidate static ambition), and 2 for those candidate who ran for city council at t and 
they ran for a higher rank office (regardless which one) at t+1 (candidate progressive 
ambition).  
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Table 3.4.A presents descriptive statistics of candidate persistence by year. Candidate 
persistence rate for same and higher ranked office are similar for all years except for 
2012. Candidate persistence for the same office (static) in 2000, 2004 and 2008 was 
34.91%, 36.26% and 35.93% respectively. Candidate persistence for higher ranked 
offices (progressive) for the same years is 1.71%, 1.73% and 1.97%, respectively. The 
decrease in 2012 in candidate persistence rates: 26.71% for same office and 1.47% for 
higher ranked offices is due to the increase in the number of candidates competing in that 
year. 
 
Table 3.4.A Candidate persistence by year 
Election Year 
(t) 
Would not run 
in t+1 
Would run in 
t+1 for CC 
Would in t+1 
for other office 
Total 
2000 171,220 94,305 4,630 270,155 
 
63.38% 34.91% 1.71% 
 2004 148,581 86,864 4,134 239,579 
 
62.02% 36.26% 1.73% 
 2008 149,123 86,305 4,743 240,171 
 
62.09% 35.93% 1.97% 
 2012 239,634 89,104 4,895 333,633 
 
71.83% 26.71% 1.47% 
 Total 708,558 356,578 18,402 1,083,538 
 
65.39% 32.91% 1.7% 
 Source: Own elaboration from TSE 
 
My two independent variables are losing (L) and Female (F). Losing is coded 1 for those 
candidates who lost the seat in election t, and 0 for those who won it. Female is coded 1 
  
67 
when the candidate is a female, and 0 for males. Based on the theory built in the previous 
chapter, I expect that Losing, Female and their interaction—i.e. the gender difference of 
the effect of losing an election—to negatively affect candidates’ political ambitions. 
 
The analysis includes a battery of control variables that can be theoretically associated 
with the candidate persistence. First, I control for previous office experience, for those 
candidates who had had an office at t-1. Previous experience in office could make 
candidates more knowledgeable about how politics works and more likely to tolerate an 
electoral setback. Then, candidates with previous office experience may be more likely to 
be more politically ambitious after an electoral setback than those without previous 
experience in offices, regardless their gender.  I create seven binary variables for previous 
office experience, one for each office: governor, senator, federal deputy, mayor of big 
municipality, mayor of a small municipality, state deputy and city council member; coded 
1 if the candidate had experience, and 0 otherwise.  
 
I also control for previous experience as candidates at t-1. Similar to the experience in 
office, experience as a candidate can make candidates more tolerable to a setback. 
Therefore, I expect that previous experience as a candidate will be positively correlated 
with political ambition, regardless their gender. I crate seven variables for experience as 
candidates, one for each office: governor, senator, federal deputy, mayor of big 
municipality, mayor of a small municipality, state deputy and city council member; coded 
1 if the candidate had experience as candidate in each of these offices and 0 otherwise. 
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Cultural factors may also affect candidate persistence. Specifically, conservatism could 
hinder women’s desires to builds a political career. This type of cultural factors can exist 
inside of a country -states more conservatives than others- (Montero, 2012), or inside of 
each state -rural cities are in general more conservative than urban ones—(Soares, 1973). 
I address this variance by including two controls in my model. First, I use a variable from 
Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) Americas Barometer, which measures 
support for women in politics.23 I calculated the average for each state and each survey 
years24 and values were assigned to the closest previous year of the election. I expect 
support for women in politics to be positively related to candidate persistence. 
Afterwards, to address the urban-rural variation I also included a dummy variable for 
those cities with more than 300,000 voters, coded 1 for those cities above this threshold. I 
expect cities with more than 300,000 to be less traditional, and consequently this should 
reduce the size of the gap because women are enabled to be more politically ambitious in 
cities than in rural areas.   
 
I also control for institutional and partisan variables. First I include a dummy variable for 
the election held under the reform of gender quotas. Since this reform forced parties to 
include 30% of women in their ballots, I expect this election to have a smaller gender gap 
in political ambition.  I also control for district—the number of seats at stake at the 
district—, party—the number of seats won by the party—and coalition magnitude—the 
                                                
23 The survey item asked, “In general, men are better political leaders than women; do 
you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?” Positive values indicate more 
support for women. 
24 For missing values for states or years I proceeded with missing data imputation based 
on region (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South), state and/or year.  
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number of seat obtained by the coalition. Larger districts, larger parties and larger 
coalition magnitudes may increase a candidate’s chances of winning the seat, and in these 
cases candidates may be more politically ambitious, regardless their gender.  
 
Finally, I control for the number of candidates in the district, the number of candidates in 
the district-coalition and the number of candidates in the district-coalition-party. The 
more candidates running, the more competitive the election, and the more competitive the 
election, the less likely a candidate is to win the seat. Similarly, in more competitive 
districts, coalitions or parties, candidates would be less politically ambitious.  
 
I conduct my analyses under two different bandwidths. I narrow down my dataset just for 
those candidates who lost or won for less than 0.09% (5th percentile) and 0.17 (10th 
percentile) of votes. By narrowing that the dataset at that point I am just analyzing those 
candidates who finished the election closer to the cutoff. I run four different model 
specifications for each bandwidth. 
 
3.4.1 Results 
Table 3.4.1.A has models 1 to 8. Models 1 and 5 in Table 3.4.1.A present the results for 
the ordinal logistic model. Model 2 and 6 include fixed effects by years, Then, Models 3 
and 7 include random effects by district. Finally Models 4 and 8 have fixed effect by year 
and random effect by district. The complete models can be found in table 2 and 3 of the 
Appendix. 
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For the eight models the variables of interest and their interaction are statistically 
significant and in the expected directions. Female has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, meaning that women are less politically ambitious than men. 
Losing an election also has a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that decreases 
political ambition, in comparison with winning an election. Finally, the interaction 
between Female and Losing is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the 
negative effect of losing on political ambition is stronger for women than for men; or, in 
other words, that the gap in political ambition between men and women is larger when 
they face an electoral setback.  
 
Table 3.4.1.A Results of the ordinal logistic analysis 
Bandwidth -/+ .09 (5th percentile) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Specification  FE by year RE by district FE by year & 
RE by District 
Female -0.137*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.121*** 
(0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0447) (0.0447) 
Losing -0.532*** -0.536*** -0.518*** -0.522*** 
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
Female X Losing -0.296*** -0.290*** -0.284*** -0.278*** 
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0544) (0.0544) 
Observations 55640 55640 55640 55640 
Bandwidth -/+ .17 (10th percentile) 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Specification  FE by year RE by district FE by year & 
RE by District 
Female -0.0959*** -0.0869*** -0.0850** -0.0768** 
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Figure 3.4.1.A presents predicted probabilities for Model 1, while Figure 3.3.1.B presents 
predicted probabilities for Model 5.25 Predicted probabilities report the probability of 
running in t+1 for each gender at the same (static ambition) or a higher ranked office 
(progressive ambition) for those candidates who lost and won the seat in t. Dots represent 
the mean, while confidents intervals at 95% were reported with the spikes.  
 
In both figures there is a gap between men and women for both types of ambitions 
between those who lost the election. Both estimations predict men who lost the election 
to be more politically ambitious than women in pursuing the same or a higher rank office. 
In the case of candidates who won the election, men are still more ambitious than women 
for both types of offices, but the confidence intervals of both groups are overlapped. This 
evidence supports hypothesis 1 by showing gender differences on candidate persistence 
between candidates who lost the election. 
 
 
                                                
25 Predicted probabilities were calculated through 1000 Monte Carlo simulations with the 
software Clarify (Tomz, Whittenberg & King, 2003). I set continuous variables at their 
mean and dichotomous variables at their mode.  
(0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0336) (0.0336) 
Losing -0.581*** -0.585*** -0.568*** -0.572*** 
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Female X Losing -0.307*** -0.302*** -0.292*** -0.289*** 
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0396) 
Observations 109156 109156 109156 109156 
* p<0.10  **p<0.05***  p<0.01 
Note: Controls not reported. Full models available in table 2 and 3 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3.4.1A: Predicted probabilities for running in next election (bandwidth: 0.09%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
73 
Figure 3.4.1.B: Predicted probabilities for running in next election (bandwidth: 0.17%) 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter tested for gender differences in the effect of losing an election on 
candidate persistence among candidates. Candidates are self-selected group of the 
population who, by throwing their hat into the ring, they have shown to have political 
ambition. I argued that losing an election may the desire to run for office for both, men 
and women, but the effect may be stronger for women. In order to test my argument, I 
used two different empirical strategies. First, I ran a regression discontinuity design to 
address the differences in political ambitions between candidates who barely won and 
candidates who barely lost. Second, keeping the bandwidth used for the RDD, I 
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conducted an ordinal logistic model with three possible outcomes in t+1: not running 
again running for the same office, or running for a higher rank office. 
 
Results in both analyses were consistent. Losing an election decreases political ambition 
regardless the sex on individuals who were already politically ambitious. However, the 
effect is stronger for women.  In conclusion, I found evidence to support my hypothesis 
1: the presence of gender difference in the effect of losing an election on political 
ambition.  
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Chapter 4: The advantage of previous experience 
as candidate 
 
In the previous chapter I show that the effect of losing an election on political ambition is 
stronger for women than for men. After losing an election women are less likely than 
men to continue running for office in future elections. However, in order to address the 
consequences that this gap in political ambition has for descriptive representation, it must 
be shown that persistent running for office improves candidates’ electoral performance 
regardless of gender. That is, that both, men and women can improve their performance 
by running with candidate experience. If this is the case that persistent candidates 
improve their performance in future elections regardless their gender; women would be 
running in disadvantage because fewer women are taking advantage of their previous 
experience as candidates.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that the previous experience as a candidate has a positive effect on 
a candidates’ electoral performance regardless of their gender. Using data from city 
council elections in Brazil from 2004 to 2016, I test my hypothesis with two measures of 
electoral performance: the candidates’ probability of being elected, and the percentage of 
votes won by each candidate. I find that having previous experience in office improves 
chances of winning a seat at the city council for men and women. I also found that, 
regardless their sex, candidates with previous experience running for office got larger 
percentages of votes than candidates with no experience in election or in office. 
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This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain the theoretical reasons for why having 
previous experience running for office might make candidate more competitive in 
elections. I also argue the reason(s) why I do not expect gender differences on that effect. 
I then describe the data and the variables used for this chapter. Next, I present the results 
of the models for the two dependent variables: the probability of winning and the 
percentage of votes. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings and how they fit in 
my theory of candidate persistence.  
 
4.1 The effect of previous experience in office 
In a previous paper my colleagues and I show that previous experience as a candidate for 
a given office could increase the probability of being elected in other offices (Haime, 
Vallejo & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017). We argued that running for office at t makes 
candidates more knowledgeable about how to run a campaign, increases the candidates’ 
networks, and makes candidates better known among voters at t+1. We found evidence 
that supports a positive effect of candidate experience on electoral performance.  
 
In that paper, we provided three theoretical arguments for why candidate experience may 
improve future electoral performance. First, we argued that by running for office, 
candidates acquire knowledge on how to run an electoral campaign that can be used in 
future elections. Candidates with prior experience running for office may have more 
expertise than the newcomers on how to efficiently allocate the resources they fundraise 
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during the campaign (Sudulich & Wall, 2011, Sudulich, 2013). An  efficient allocation of 
campaign resources may lead to improve a candidate’s electoral performance.  
 
Second, candidates who had already run for office, despite losing the seat, may be better 
known among voters. Voters may have seen these candidates during their campaign or in 
the ballots in the previous election. Consequently, the names of the candidates with prior 
candidate experience may sound more familiar to voters, increasing their name 
recognition and their chances of being elected (Stokes & Miller, 1962; Kam & 
Zechmeister, 2013) 
 
Finally, previous candidate experience may improve candidates’ networks in their parties 
and among donors. Party members and campaign donors can assistant candidates through 
public endorsements, making the candidate known among votes, and mobilizing voters 
(Boas et al. 2014; Arceneaux 2009; Jacobson 1978, Desmarais et al. 2015, Rosenstone & 
Hansen 1993; Snyder 1990). When running for office, candidates are in contact with 
these actors. Candidates who have previously run for office may also have an advantage 
with respect to the newcomers because they already know most of these actors. I expect a 
better electoral performance of those candidates who had previous networks among the 
party and the donors.  
 
The first two mechanisms described above -the increase in candidates’ knowledge on 
how to run an electoral campaign, and that running for office make candidates better 
known among voters- should not be different for men and women. Women may increase 
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their knowledge on how to run an electoral campaign after running for office as much as 
their male counterparts. In the same way, women may become better known among 
voters by running for office. However, some scholars have found patterns of gender 
marginalization among donors in the Brazilian case. These scholars have highlighted how 
relevant campaign contributions are in open list systems, and the disparities between men 
and women candidates in Brazil. These scholars have found evidence that male 
candidates perform better on Election Day because they fundraise significantly more 
money than their female counterparts, and that the gender gap on fundraising is due to a 
bias against women among donors (Sacchet & Speck, 2012; Sacchet & Speck, 2012a; 
Araujo, 2013; Speck & Mancuso, 2014). If these scholars are right, candidate experience 
should not help women to fundraise, as much as their male counterparts, because donors 
would discriminate against them regardless of whether they have previous experience in 
elections. However, these studies do not distinguish between newcomers, and candidates 
with previous campaign experience. It may be the case that donors favor male candidates, 
not because of the intrinsic effect of their gender, but rather because most candidates with 
experience running elections in Brazil are men. Given the fact that the arguments 
supporting a pattern of marginalization of campaign contributions against women are not 
conclusive, I expect that candidates with previous experience running for office have a 
better electoral performance than newcomers, regardless of gender: 
 
H2: Previous experience as candidate has a positive effect on candidates’ electoral 
performance regardless of their gender.  
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4.2 Data and methods 
For this chapter I use data from city council elections in Brazil from 2004 to 2016.26 
Electoral performance is measured using two variables. The first variable is seat won, 
coded 1 for those candidates who got elected in election t, and 0 otherwise. However, 
though they did not get elected, candidate experience could still improve candidates’ 
electoral performance. For that reason I include a second measure of electoral 
performance. Vote share is coded as the percentage of votes got by candidate i in election 
t over the total of positive votes in the election.  
 
My first independent variable is city council candidate experience, coded 1 for those 
candidates who ran for the city council and lost the seat in t-1. City council candidate 
experience is coded 0 for newcomers (candidates with no experience running for city 
council in t-1) and for those candidates who ran and won the city council seat in t-1. The 
second independent variable is female, coded 1 for women and 0 for men. To test for 
different effects of city council candidate experience by gender, I interact the two 
independent variables.  
 
I also include in the models a set of covariates related with the candidates’ previous 
experience in elections, or in an office different than city council candidate experience. 
First, I include a dummy variable, any candidate experience, for those candidates with 
experience running for office in any other office than the city council. I also control for 
city council office experience, coded 1 for those candidates who had a seat at the city 
                                                
26 Despite my dataset starts in 2000, I just use the first year to the code previous 
experience for the following year, and then I drop the first year of the election.  
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council in t-1, and 0 otherwise. Finally, I include a dummy variable for those candidates’ 
with previous experience in an office different than the city council: any office 
experience. I expect these three variables to have a positive effect on electoral 
performance. 
 
In addition, I include a set of electoral, institutional, and cultural variables as controls. 
Regarding the electoral variables I include the number of candidates competing in the 
district, the number of candidates competing in the coalition, and the number of 
candidates competing in the party. In the three cases, the number of candidates is a proxy 
of the level of electoral competition in the district, the coalition and the party, 
respectively. For the three cases I expect that the more competitive the district, the 
coalition or the party, the worse the candidate’s electoral performance. I also include the 
district magnitude as a control. Larger district magnitudes, i.e. more seats at stake, may 
increase a candidate’s chances of winning. I also create a dummy variable for the 
elections with gender quotas after the 2009 mandate. Gender quotas increase the number 
of women competing, which may lead to a lower percentage of women elected over the 
total of women competing. I expect a negative effect on women’s electoral performance, 
and no effect for the case of men.  
 
Finally, I include two cultural variables for the support for women in politics. The first 
cultural variable is, support for women, which was created based on a question from 
Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) Americas Barometer. The survey 
item asked, “In general, men are better political leaders than women; do you strongly 
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agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?” Positive values indicate more support for 
women. Using survey data, I calculate the state-year average. For those missing years or 
states I proceeded with missing data imputation based on region (North, Northeast, 
Center-West, Southeast and South), state and/or year. Election years were merged with 
the closest previous year of the survey. I expect more support for women to increase 
women’s chance of being elected, and negatively correlated with the men’s chances of 
being elected. Finally I include a dummy, big city, variable for cities with more than 
300,000 voters. Larger cities might be less conservative, and consequently, more 
supportive of women at elections. I expect big city to have a positive effect on women’s 
electoral performance, and a negative effect on men’s electoral performance. Table 4.2.A 
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of the models.  
 
Table 4.2.A Descriptive statistics: previous experience as candidate 
Variable    N  Mean    SD      Min    Max                                                                                                                               
Seat won    1155197 0.13    0.34      0     1   
Vote share    1155197 0.01    0.02      0     0.86   
City council candidate experience 1155197 0.19    0.39      0     1   
Any candidate experience  1155197 0.01    0.1      0     1   
City council office experience 1155197 0.09    0.28      0     1   
Any office experience   1155197 0.0001    0.01      0     1   
Candidates competing in district 1155197 116.87    156.72   2     1369   
Candidates competing in coalition 1155197 25.43    61.03     1     994   
Candidates competing in party 1155197 10.7    9.55      1     88   
District magnitude   1155197 9.9    6.1      9     55   
Gender quotas    1155197 0.58    0.49      0     1   
Support for women   1155197 2.84    0.33      1.88    3.58   
Big city    1155197 0.05    0.21      0     1   
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The analysis consists in six different models. Model 1 is a logistic regression for the 
entire sample where the dependent variable is seat won and the independent variable, city 
council candidate experience, is interacted by gender. Model 2 is a fractional logistic 
regression, which uses vote share as dependent variable and it, interacts city council 
candidate experience by gender. Models 3 to 6 use split samples. Model 3 is a logistic 
model just for men, and Model 4 uses a logistic regression 4 just for women. Finally, for 
Models 5 and 6, I use a fractional logistic model where the dependent variable is vote 
share.  
 
Formally, what I estimate in Model 1 is   !! = ! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!! ∙ !! + !! + !! 
where Y is an binary indicator of winning the city council office for candidate i in !; X is 
a binary indicator of city council candidate experience; F is a binary indicator for the sex 
of the candidate; and ! is a battery of controls. 
 
For Model 2 the estimation is  !!! = ! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!! ∙ !! + !! + !! 
where !! is a fractional indicator of the percentage of votes obtained by candidate i in t 
over the total of valid votes in a given district; X is a binary indicator of city council 
candidate experience; F is a binary indicator for the sex of i; and ! is the battery of 
controls. 
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For Models 3 and 4 I am estimating !!! = ! + !!!! + !! + !! 
where !! is a binary indicator of winning the city council office for candidate i in !; X is 
a binary indicator for city council candidate experience; and ! is a battery of controls. 
Model 3 is estimated in the subsample of the men in the dataset, while Model 4 is the 
subsample of women.  
 
Similarly, Models 5 and 6 estimate !!! = ! + !!!! + !! + !! 
where !! is a fractional indicator of the percentage of votes obtained by candidate i in t 
over the total of valid votes in a given district; X is a binary indicator city council 
candidate experience; and c is a set of control variables. Model 5 is estimated in the 
subsample of men, and Model 6, in the subsample of women. 
 
4.3 Results 
Figure 4.3.A presents the results for Models 1 through 6. I only report the results for the 
independent variables of interest. Marbles are the estimated coefficients, while lines 
represent 95% confidence intervals. The entire models can be found in Tables 4 in the 
Appendix. Results are consistent across specifications and for both dependent variables. 
For Model 1 and 2, the coefficient for city council candidate experience is positive and 
statistically significant, the coefficient for women is negative and statistically significant, 
and the interaction between these two variables is positive and statistically significant. 
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For Models 3 to 6, the coefficients for city council candidate experience are positive and 
statistically significant for both men (Models 3 and 5) and women (Models 4 and 6). The 
variable city council candidate experience is positively correlated with both measures of 
winning the seat and the percentage of votes obtained by candidates. For Models 1 and 2 
being a woman is negatively related with winning a seat (Model 1) or the percentage of 
votes obtained (Model 2), but the interaction between being a woman and having city 
council candidate experience is positively related with both dependent variables.   
 
For a better interpretation of the interactive terms, Figure 4.3.B presents the predicted 
probabilities of winning a seat based on Model 1 for men and women, with and without 
previous city council candidate experience respectively. Both genders improve their 
chances of being elected when they have city council candidate experience. However, the 
change from not having to having previous experience as candidates is larger for women. 
Women with no not experience at all have 3.54% chances of being elected, while the 
chances of women with city council candidate experience are 10.42% (change of 6.92%). 
With regard to the men, when they do not have any kind of experience their chances of 
winning are 9.61%, while when they have city council candidate experience their chances 
increase to 13.06% (change of 3.45%).  
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Figure 4.3.B Predicted probability of winning a seat for male and female candidates, with 
and without previous experience as candidates
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I examined whether previous experience as a candidate improves future 
electoral performance, regardless of the gender of the candidate. The motivation to pursue 
this question originated from the fact that, as shown in Chapter 3, women are less likely than 
men to continue running for office after losing an election. Despite previous research 
showing that previous campaign experience improves future electoral performance, there 
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were theoretical reasons to think that women would not benefit from their experience running 
for office compared to men.  
 
As in a previous article, I argue that previous experience running for office may be beneficial 
for three reasons: it gives candidates knowledge on how to run a campaign; it gives 
candidates networks among party member and donors; and it makes candidates better known 
among voters. I hypothesized that men and women would improve their electoral 
performance from their previous experience as candidates. I tested my hypothesis with two 
different measures of electoral performance: candidates’ probability of winning the seat, and 
the percentage of votes obtained by candidate. Previous candidate experience coded as a 
binary indicator of having run for the city council in t-1. 
 
Results support my hypothesis. Previous experience as candidate is positively correlated with 
both measures of electoral performance regardless the gender of the candidate. Men and 
women show better electoral performance when they have previous experience running for 
office. Predicted probabilities show the difference in vote share between women with 
experience and women without experience is larger than the same type of change among 
men.  
 
Viewing these results in light of the findings from Chapter 3, allows us to think about the 
consequences of the gender gap in candidate persistence. Candidates who persist running for 
office despite losing do better in elections than candidates with no experience. However, if 
women are less likely to persist in running after losing, women as a group would be 
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disadvantaged because the ratio of women running with prior experience as candidates would 
be lower than the ratio of men with this type of experience. In the following chapter I 
examine the magnitude of the effect of the gender gap in candidate persistence by looking at 
the gender composition of the municipal chambers.  
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Chapter 5: The consequences of the gender gap in 
candidate persistence on female descriptive 
representation 
 
 
Does the gender gap in candidate persistence have consequences for descriptive 
representation? In Chapter 3, I show that women are less likely than men to continue running 
for office after losing an election (candidate persistence). Later, in Chapter 4, I found that 
men and women who had already run and lost the seat in previous elections (candidate 
experience) do better when they run than candidates with no experience at all. In view of 
these two findings, we may expect candidate persistence to have an effect on the percentage 
of women elected, through the effect of candidate experience. If women are less likely to 
persist in running after losing, they would be disadvantaged because the proportion of 
women running with prior experience as candidates would be lower than the proportion of 
men with this type of experience. In this chapter, I explore how the gender gap in candidate 
persistence has an effect on the percentage of women elected. 
 
Using data from Brazilian municipal elections from 2004 to 2016, I test the effect of the gap 
in candidate persistence on women’s descriptive representation, measured as the proportion 
of elected women in each election. I find that the percentage of women persisting in running 
for office is positively related with the percentage of women elected. In addition, I run 
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predicted probabilities for the election years as if there were no gender gap on candidate 
persistence. I find that if women persist in running for office in the same rate than men, i.e. as 
if there were no gender gap, they would get 2.5-3.5% more seats than their current number of 
seats in the municipal chambers.  
 
The chapter proceeds as following. First, I briefly summarize the literature of female 
descriptive representation in Brazil, and I assert the hypothesis for this chapter. Next, I 
describe the data and methods used in the chapter. Later, I present the results for the models. 
Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings.  
 
5.1 Female descriptive representation in Brazil 
Brazil ranks 153th in the world for female representation in parliament, according to data 
from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.27 Just 10.7% of the members of the Brazilian lower 
chamber are women. A large set of literature has argued that the low percentage of women in 
Brazilian legislative offices is due to the open list, proportional representation electoral 
system (Miguel, 2008; Hoodfar & Tajali, 2011; Schmidt, 2008). This electoral system allows 
voters to cast their vote for individuals and influence the order in which candidates, in a party 
or coalition, are elected. In so far as voters can modify this order, candidates have to compete 
with candidates from other parties, but also from their own party. Under these rules, female 
candidates have poorly performed competing with their male counter parts.  
 
                                                
27 Values and ranking checked on October 28th, 2018 
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This situation is not exclusive of the Lower Chamber. All legislative offices in Brazil use the 
open list system, and all these offices have, on average, a low percentage of women 
occupying seats.  
 
There are two main explanations for women’s underrepresentation in open list system. The 
first explanation argues that voters may be discriminating against women (Jones and Navia, 
1999; Htun and Jones, 2002). Voters may have the option of voting for female candidates, 
but they are not voting for them because they prefer male politicians. There is evidence that 
in open list systems, gender attitudes are context and culture-specific. For example, 
Schwindt-Bayer, et. al. show that in Ireland, voters prefer male candidates to females, while 
in Australia, voters prefer women. In Malta, gender does not make any difference for voters 
(Schwindt-Bayer et. al. 2010). However, this seems not to be the case for Brazil. Aguilar, et. 
al. have found a pro-women bias using a survey experiment in Sao Paulo. In particular, they 
find that both female and male voters are more likely to vote for females, with a 7% increase 
in support for a hypothetical candidates when that candidate is female instead of male 
(Aguilar et al, 2015).  
 
The second explanation argues that financial campaign resources are unequally distributed 
between male and female candidates, to the detriment of the latter. Since electoral campaigns 
in Brazil are candidate-centered, the money each candidate can raise is determinant for 
winning elections (Samuels, 2001a; 2001b). Thus, if women candidates receive fewer 
resources than their male counterparts, they are disadvantaged because they may be less 
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visible to voters, regardless of voters’ attitudes towards gender (Sacchet and Speck, 2012; 
Sacchet and Speck, 2012a; Araujo, 2013; Speck and Mancuso, 2014).       
 
However, the relation between campaign financial resources and the probability of winning a 
seat is theoretically endogenous. It may not be that campaign financial resources influence 
the probability of winning elections, but the other way around: the probability of winning 
elections might increase the money raised for campaigns by a candidate. Those candidates 
who are first in the polls, with clear chances of being elected, are more likely to receive 
campaign contributions than those candidates with less or no chances of being elected. If that 
is the case, these studies would be omitting a third variable that is producing both: 
fundraising and winning elections. 
 
In addition to the two previous explanations for the poor performance of women on open list 
systems, in this chapter I present a new explanation related with the gender gap in candidate 
persistence. In the previous chapter, I explained that candidate experience improves 
individual candidates’ performance regardless their gender in open list system. Here, I argue 
that candidate experience also has consequences in the percentage of women elected. If 
candidate experience improves electoral performance at the candidate level (Anagol & 
Fujiwara, 2016; Haime, Vallejo & Schwindt-Bayer, 2017), a larger proportion of women 
with candidate experience running for office would lead to a larger number of women being 
elected. Specifically, I claim that: 
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H3: The larger the percentage of women with candidate experience running for legislative 
offices, the larger the percentage of women elected at those offices. 
 
Formally, I estimate !! = ! + !!! + !! + !! 
 
where ! is a fractional indicator of the proportion of women elected in each municipality ! at time !; ! is the ratio between women who had previously run for city council in ! − 1 and lost that seat, over 
the total of candidates running for ! in ! who are; and ! is a set of controls.  
 
5.2 Data and Methods 
To test my hypothesis, I use data from Brazilian municipalities from 2004 to 2016 from 
Tribunal Supremo Eleitoral. In contrast with the previous chapter, here the unit of analysis is 
the municipal chamber instead of the candidates. In total, the dataset contains 21, 639 
observations over a span of four election cycles (2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016).  
 
The dependent variable of the analysis is women elected. This variable is measured as the 
percentage of women who won a seat over the total number of seats at stake, in each 
municipal chamber and in each election year. City council elections have the same electoral 
system as the Brazilian lower chamber. Also, the percentage of women elected is relatively 
low. Figure 5.2.A shows the frequency of the percentages of elected women by year. The 
mean for 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 are 12.72%, 12.51%, 13.25% and 13.12, respectively.  
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Figure 5.2.A: Frequency of percentages of women elected in Brazilian city chambers (2004-
2016) 
 
 
To test my hypothesis, I estimate two OLS and two fractional logistic models. Neither the 
dependent nor the main independent variable change across models. I expect the three 
models to be consistent in the direction of the relation between variables. One of the OLS 
models and one of the fractional logistic models include fixed effects by election year. The 
other two OLS and fraction logistic models control for gender quotas.28 All four models are 
run with clustered standard error for district.  
 
The models include several control variables. My first control variable is percentage of men 
with candidate experience, which is a fractional variable that takes the value of the 
                                                
28 Models with fixed effects are not controlled by gender quotas because of collinearity.  
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proportion of male candidates who run for the city council in ! − 1, lost the seat, and ran 
again in t. Since candidate experience improves electoral performance, I expect that the 
larger the percentage of men running with candidate experience, the smaller the percentage 
of women elected. I also control for the percentage of male and the percentage female 
incumbents. Given that incumbency increases candidates’ chances of winning, the percentage 
of women running in t should be positively related with the percentage of women elected, 
while the percentage of men, negatively related. In addition, I include the number of women 
running for office in each election, for which I expect a positive relationship. Furthermore, I 
control for district magnitude. Existing literature about open list systems has shown that 
district magnitude does not facilitate (Schmidt, 2008), nor is it negatively related with the 
proportion of elected women (Araújo & García, 2006). Thus, I expect a negative relationship 
between district magnitude and the percentage of women elected.  Additionally, I control for 
big city, which is a binary indicator for cities with more than 200,000 voters. I expect larger 
cities to be less conservative in social issues and consequently, more supportive with female 
candidatures. Then, big city should be positively related with the percentage of women 
elected (Soares, 1973). I also control for support for women in politics, a variable from Latin 
American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) Americas Barometer, which measures support 
for women in politics.29 I calculated the average for each state and each survey years30 and 
values were assigned to the closest previous year of the election. I expect support for women 
to be positively related with the percentage of women elected. Finally, I include gender 
                                                
29 The survey item asked, “In general, men are better political leaders than women; do you 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?” Positive values indicate more support 
for women. 
30 For missing values for states or years I proceeded with missing data imputation based on 
region (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South), state and/or year.  
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quotas, a binary indicator for the elections held after the reform of gender quotas (2009). The 
reform of gender quotas in Brazil mandate parties to have 30% of women in their ballots, 
which increased the number of women running for office. Consequently, I expect gender 
quotas to be positively related with the percentage of women elected. Table 5.2.A presents 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
 
Table 5.2.A Descriptive statistics: % of women elected 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
% of women elected 21639 0.13 0.14 0 0.63 
% of women with candidate 
experience 21639 0.04 0.03 0 0.24 
% of men with candidate 
experience 21639 0.14 0.07 0 0.52 
% of female incumbent 
running 21639 0.02 0.03 0 0.33 
% of male incumbent running 21639 0.1 0.07 0 0.8 
Number of women running 21639 14.95 16.48 0 404 
District magnitude 21639 7.03 3.12 9 55 
Big city (+200.000) 21639 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Support for women 21639 2.81 0.33 1.88 3.58 
Gender quota 21639 0.5 0.5 0 1 
 
 
 
5.3 Results 
Table 5.3.A presents the results of four models testing the effect of the percentage of women 
with candidate experience on the percentage of women elected. Model 1 is an OLS model 
with fixed effects by year; Model 2 is a OLS model which controls for gender quotas; Model 
3 is a fractional model with fixed effects by years; and Model 4 is a fractional model which 
controls for the presence of regulated gender quotas.  
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The directionality of the estimates within the four models is consistent with my expectations: 
the percentage of women with candidate experience is positively related with the percentage 
of women elected. The results are statistically significant to a 99% confidence level.  
 
 
Table 5.3.A: Models for the effect of women running with candidate experience on the 
percentage of women elected 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 OLS OLS Fractional Fractional 
% of women with candidate 
experience 
0.355*** 0.324*** 3.138*** 2.873*** 
(0.0320) (0.0314) (0.271) (0.268) 
% of men with candidate 
experience 
-0.122*** -0.120*** -1.069*** -1.055*** 
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.142) (0.142) 
% of female incumbent 
running 
1.797*** 1.796*** 12.83*** 12.82*** 
(0.0508) (0.0508) (0.347) (0.348) 
% of male incumbent 
running 
-0.213*** -0.218*** -2.145*** -2.184*** 
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.149) (0.149) 
Number of women running 
-0.000176** -0.000196** -0.00173** -0.00189** 
(0.0000827) (0.0000824) (0.000784) (0.000782) 
District magnitude 
-0.000784* -0.000777* -0.00535 -0.00535 
(0.000434) (0.000435) (0.00403) (0.00404) 
Big city (+200.000) 
0.0320** 0.0340** 0.244* 0.260** 
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.130) (0.129) 
Support for women 
-0.0228*** -0.0122*** -0.202*** -0.113*** 
(0.00378) (0.00318) (0.0325) (0.0282) 
Gender quota 
 0.00241  0.0246 
 (0.00213)  (0.0190) 
2008 
-0.00342 
 
-0.0359  
(0.00259) 
 
(0.0240)  
2012 
0.0125*** 
 
0.110***  
(0.00309) 
 
(0.0276)  
2016 
-0.00768*** -0.0651**  
(0.00282)  (0.0253)  
Observations 21639 21639 21639 21639 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01   
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For a better understanding of the magnitude of the relationship that the percentage of women 
with candidate experience has on the percentage of women elected, Figure 5.3.A presents the 
real data and simulations based on Model 1.31 For this chapter I am not interested in the 
effect of the percentage of women with candidate experience itself, but in the effect of the 
gender gap in candidates with previous experience running for office on the percentage of 
women elected. For that reason, I present the predicted probabilities in an unusual way. The 
y-axis shows the average percentage of elected women in all municipalities, while the x-axis 
displays the election year. For all years, the orange bars display the actual average percentage 
of women elected in all the Brazilian city council included in the dataset. The green bars 
show the simulated average of elected women for all municipalities calculated using the 
actual percentage of women with candidate experience in each year, and its 95% confidence 
intervals. Finally, the blue bars shows the simulated average percentage of elected women for 
all municipalities estimated using, instead of the percentage of women, the percentage of 
men with candidate experience in that election, and its 95% confidence intervals. In other 
words, the blue bars shows the percentage of women elected as if there were no gap in 
candidate persistence between men and women.  
 
As expected, the differences between the simulation at actual values of women’s candidate 
experience and the simulation with no gender gap are statistically significant. For 2004, the 
simulated percentage of women at the actual values of women with candidate experience was 
13.04%, while the simulation was 16.58 % (3.54% difference). For 2008, the estimated 
                                                
31 Simulations were calculated through 1000 Monte Carlo simulations with the software 
Clarify (Tomz, Whittenberg & King, 2003). I set continuous variables at their mean and 
dichotomous variables at their mode.   
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values were 12.76% and 15.72%, correspondingly (2.96% difference). For 2012, the 
estimations were 13.46% and 16.59%, respectively (3.13% difference). Lastly, for 2016 the 
simulation at actual values was 13.05, while the simulation for a no gap situation was 15.65  
(2.59%. difference).  
 
Figure 5.3.A Real and simulated % of elected women 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter I examined whether the percentage of women running with candidate 
experience in a given election increases the percentage of women elected in that election. 
The motivation to pursue this question originated from the fact that, as shown in previous 
chapters I had shown that a) women are less likely than men to continue running for office 
after losing an election (gender differences in candidate persistence); and b) candidates with 
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previous experience running for office (candidate experience) do better in future elections 
than candidates with no experience running for office. Consequently, we may expect the 
gender gap in candidate persistence at the aggregate level to have consequences on the 
outcome of the election.  
 
To test my expectation I used data from the municipalities in Brazil. In concrete, I look at the 
effect of the percentage of women with candidate experience on the percentage of women 
elected. Findings supported my expectation. The percentage of women with candidate 
experience is positively related with the percentage of women elected at the municipal 
chamber. I simulated a scenario with no gender gap, where the same percentage of men and 
women with candidate experience run for office. I found that if there were no gender gap 
women would have won from 2.5 to 3.5% more seats.  
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   Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Previous studies have argued that women are less politically ambitious than men. They found 
that when comparing potential candidates, women are less likely than men to start a political 
career, and when comparing elected officials, women are less likely than men to run for 
higher offices. The question of what happens with the political ambitions of those candidates 
who run and lose has not been explored. In this dissertation I filled this lacuna by developing 
a theory for a gendered effect of losing an election on the probability of rerunning in future 
elections: candidate persistence. 
 
6.1 Basic findings 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the gender gap in political ambition and sets up the theory 
used in the following chapters for the gender gap in candidate persistence and its 
consequences on representation. I argued that we might expect a gender gap in candidate 
persistence because women feel less qualified to run for office than their male counterpart 
with equal qualifications. Thus, a negative update on their initial perception about their skills 
as candidates may be stronger for women. I also argue that the gap in candidate persistence 
have consequences on descriptive representation. If fewer women than men persist as 
candidates, fewer women than men would be taking advantage of their prior experience as 
candidates which, as has been shown, improves candidates’ electoral performance. 
 
I tested my theory in Brazilian city council elections for several reasons. First, the electoral 
system in Brazil promotes intraparty competition. In order to get elected, candidates depend 
on the number of votes they got. So, they have incentive to get more votes than their co-
  
102 
partisans. Second, because of the cost of a campaign and the political career pattern in Brazil, 
city council elections are the place where political career starts. Third, gender quotas in 
Brazil sharply increased the number of women running for office. This makes Brazilian city 
council elections a good case to test my theory with a considerable number of candidates of 
both genders. Finally, I argued that Brazil could be considered a case were men and women’s 
political ambition differs.  
 
In Chapter 3, I test the gender difference in the effect of losing an election on candidate 
persistence using two different strategies. The first strategy involves a regression 
discontinuity design. I compare candidates who barely won and barely lost and election to 
calculate the effect of losing. Later, I estimate the difference of the effect of losing between 
men and women. Differences are statistically significant: after losing an election, women are 
less likely to continue running for office than their male counterpart. In Chapter 3 I also 
analyze the gender difference in the effect of losing an election on candidate persistence 
using an ordinal logistic model. With this specification, I differentiate between the 
probabilities of not running, running for the same office and running for a higher rank office 
in the following election. Results are consistent with regression discontinuity. Female are less 
likely to run for office after losing an election, for the same or higher ranked office.  
 
In Chapter 4, I test if there are gender differences in the effect of having previous experience 
running for office and losing on the candidates’ electoral performance. I test my hypothesis 
using two measures of candidate’s electoral performance: the probability of winning a seat 
and the percentage of votes obtained by each candidate. I find that having candidate 
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experience is positively related with both measures of electoral performance regardless the 
gender of the candidate. Both, men and women improve their chances of being elected and 
their chances of winning a seat when they have candidate experience. 
 
In Chapter 5 I look at the consequences of candidate persistence at the aggregate level. I find 
that the percentage of women running with previous candidate experience is positively 
correlated with the percentage of women elected. Predicted probabilities, based on values of 
previous elections, estimate that in a scenario of no gender gap in candidate persistence, 
women would have gotten from 2.5% to 3.5% more seats. 
 
In light of the three empirical chapters, the gender gap in candidate persistence (the behavior 
of running for office despite having lose) is related with gender descriptive representation. If 
women are less likely to continue running for office after losing than men, fewer women 
would be running with candidate experience. Then, if candidate experience improves 
candidates’ electoral performance, men would be more likely to get elected because more 
men than women would be running with candidate experience. Consequently, the gender gap 
in candidate persistence is negatively related with the percentage of women elected, through 
the effect of candidate experience. 
 
6.2 Further research 
Further research should continue testing the effect of losing an election on candidate 
persistence under different electoral system. Open list PR provides a competitive 
environment to test the effect of losing. However, other electoral system with no incentives 
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for intraparty competition may moderate the effect of losing. For example, in closed list 
system the ranking of candidate that get elected, and the electoral campaign in general, are 
mostly decided and run by the parties or its leaders. In closed list systems candidates know 
from beforehand how likely they are to get the seat, and that getting elected does not depend 
on them. Then, regardless their gender, the frustration after losing the seat would not be a big 
as in electoral systems where winning or losing largely depends on them. In contrast, single 
member district elections present a candidate centered environment, where the candidate is 
largely responsible of the number of votes he or she get. Here, as in open list elections, we 
may expect a strong effect of losing but also a gender gap on this effect.  
 
Another area to explore is, instead of the effect of losing, the effect of winning. Winning may 
have a positive effect on candidate’s political ambition. A large literature on the incumbent 
effect has discussed all the advantages that incumbents have to continue running and they 
increase their political ambition. Winning an election could also have different effects on 
political ambition depending on the gender of the candidate. If women are less self confident 
about their skills as candidates, winning an election may update their prior beliefs in a 
stronger manner than for men, who are already confident enough on their qualifications. By 
winning an office, women would show themselves that they more qualified than what they 
thought, sharply increasing their confidence, and subsequently, their political ambition.  
 
6.3 Implications 
The gender gap in candidate persistence may have implications in other areas of study. 
Business, athletic and academic careers, as equal as politics, requires ambition, willingness 
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for competition and frustration tolerance. If the gender gap in candidate persistence has a 
correlate in professional careers, it could be relevant to explain careers choices and 
outcomes. It would be particularly pertinent to explore why the pipeline theory is no 
producing the expected gender equality in top positions in business (Bertrand and Hallock, 
2001; Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz 2010), STEM science (Fischer, 2015), and academia 
(National Science Board, 2014).  
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    Appendix 
 
 
Table 6.1: District Magnitude for Brazilian City chambers by population 
 
Inhabitants in city # of city council members 
Minimum Maximum  
 15000 9 
15001 30000 11 
30001 50000 13 
50001 80000 15 
80001 120000 17 
120001 160000 19 
160001 300000 21 
300001 450000 23 
450001 600000 25 
600001 750000 27 
750001 900000 29 
900001 1050000 31 
1050001 1250000 33 
1250001 1350000 35 
1350001 1500000 37 
1500001 1800000 39 
1800001 2400000 41 
2400001 3000000 43 
3000001 4000000 45 
4000001 5000000 47 
5000001 6000000 49 
6000001 7000000 51 
7000001 8000000 53 
8000001  55 
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Table 6.2: Ordinal Logistic model. Bandwidth 0.09% 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Female -0.135*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0447) (0.0447) 
Losing -0.523*** -0.527*** -0.510*** -0.513*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
Female X 
Losing  
-0.300*** -0.294*** -0.287*** -0.282*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0544) (0.0544) 
% of votes 2.771*** 2.768*** 2.293** 2.596*** 
 (0.851) (0.852) (0.951) (0.949) 
 
Previous Experience in office 
State Deputy 3.268*** 3.382*** 3.505*** 3.589*** 
 (1.156) (1.160) (1.166) (1.174) 
Mayor Small 
Municipality 
-0.0464 0.0435 -0.00300 0.0719 
 (0.712) (0.711) (0.722) (0.720) 
City Council 0.393*** 0.455*** 0.390*** 0.444*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0266) 
 
Previous experience as candidate 
Federal Deputy 1.384*** 1.358*** 1.387*** 1.368*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.165) (0.164) 
Senator 2.759*** 2.756*** 2.703*** 2.708*** 
 (0.614) (0.614) (0.620) (0.620) 
State Deputy 1.015*** 0.992*** 0.987*** 0.970*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0933) (0.0941) (0.0940) 
Governor 1.401 1.387 1.542 1.553 
 (1.144) (1.177) (1.185) (1.219) 
Mayor Big 
Municipality 
-0.434 -0.404 -0.388 -0.369 
 (1.061) (1.049) (1.028) (1.021) 
Mayor Small 
Municipality 
0.216 0.264 0.237 0.278 
 (0.176) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) 
City Council 0.653*** 0.712*** 0.641*** 0.692*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0245) (0.0255) 
     
Support for 
women in 
politics 
-0.0585** 0.0713** -0.107*** 0.0397 
 (0.0283) (0.0321) (0.0313) (0.0355) 
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Big city -0.179*** -0.181*** -0.106 -0.143 
 (0.0574) (0.0579) (0.0884) (0.0882) 
Gender quota -0.184***  -0.170***  
 (0.0199)  (0.0205)  
Candidates 
competing in 
district 
0.000321** 0.000382*** 0.0000732 0.000278 
 (0.000136) (0.000136) (0.000185) (0.000185) 
Candidates 
competing in 
coalition 
-0.00183*** -0.00171*** -0.00147*** -0.00138*** 
 (0.000157) (0.000158) (0.000168) (0.000168) 
Candidates 
competing in 
party 
0.0151*** 0.0139*** 0.0117*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.00156) (0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00166) 
District 
magnitude 
-0.0105*** -0.0101*** 0.00132 0.000246 
 (0.00199) (0.00200) (0.00263) (0.00261) 
Coalition 
magnitude 
0.0322*** 0.0357*** 0.0172*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.00603) (0.00607) (0.00636) (0.00639) 
Party 
magnitude 
-0.0343*** -0.0410*** -0.0172** -0.0247*** 
 (0.00823) (0.00826) (0.00858) (0.00860) 
2000  0  0.427*** 
  (.)  (0.0308) 
2004  -0.222***  0.235*** 
  (0.0264)  (0.0310) 
2008  -0.193***  0.257*** 
  (0.0269)  (0.0305) 
2012  -0.448***   
  (0.0294)   
cut1 -0.757*** -0.499*** -0.849*** -0.0981 
 (0.0861) (0.0968) (0.0943) (0.122) 
cut2 3.177*** 3.440*** 3.130*** 3.884*** 
 (0.0887) (0.0994) (0.0965) (0.124) 
Variance 
(random effect 
by district) 
  0.0726*** 0.0679*** 
  (0.00747) (0.00726) 
Observations 55640 55640 55640 55640 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  
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Table 6.3: Ordinal Logistic model. Bandwidth 0.17% 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Female -0.0913*** -0.0825** -0.0805** -0.0725** 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0336) (0.0336) 
Losing -0.577*** -0.581*** -0.564*** -0.568*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Female X 
Losing 
-0.310*** -0.306*** -0.296*** -0.293*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0396) 
% of votes 4.097*** 4.114*** 4.308*** 4.664*** 
 (0.605) (0.606) (0.692) (0.690) 
 
Previous experience in office 
Federal Deputy 31.29 31.41 34.83 35.08 
 (1182092.0) (1182092.0) (6393919.5) (6977916.4) 
State Deputy 1.747 1.766 1.895* 1.887* 
 (1.088) (1.102) (1.093) (1.104) 
Mayor Small 
Municipality 
-0.897* -0.839* -0.884* -0.830* 
(0.492) (0.491) (0.498) (0.496) 
City Council 0.411*** 0.468*** 0.408*** 0.456*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0195) 
 
Previous experience as candidate 
Federal Deputy 1.501*** 1.480*** 1.450*** 1.438*** 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Senator 2.125*** 2.123*** 2.071*** 2.076*** 
 (0.510) (0.508) (0.515) (0.512) 
State Deputy 1.086*** 1.067*** 1.046*** 1.033*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0616) (0.0620) (0.0620) 
Governor 3.196*** 3.206*** 3.254*** 3.273*** 
 (0.705) (0.710) (0.709) (0.712) 
Mayor Big 
Municipality 
0.939 0.989 0.845 0.879 
(0.753) (0.753) (0.744) (0.745) 
Mayor Small 
Municipality 
0.216* 0.256** 0.220* 0.255* 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.131) 
City Council 0.640*** 0.692*** 0.622*** 0.667*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0178) 
     
Support for 
women in 
politics 
-0.0727*** 0.0669*** -0.134*** 0.0340 
(0.0203) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0264) 
Big city -0.340*** -0.349*** -0.355*** -0.393*** 
(0.0385) (0.0388) (0.0669) (0.0665) 
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Gender quota -0.200***  -0.186***  
 (0.0142)  (0.0147)  
Candidates 
competing in 
district 
0.0000318 0.000117 0.0000635 0.000283** 
(0.0000837) (0.0000839) (0.000121) (0.000121) 
Candidates 
competing in 
coalition 
-0.00142*** -0.00128*** -0.00117*** -0.00109*** 
(0.0000974) (0.0000979) (0.000103) (0.000103) 
Candidates 
competing in 
party 
0.00885*** 0.00794*** 0.00609*** 0.00568*** 
(0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
District 
magnitude 
-0.00536*** -0.00538*** 0.00323* 0.00205 
(0.00134) (0.00134) (0.00179) (0.00179) 
Coalition 
magnitude 
0.0283*** 0.0328*** 0.0159*** 0.0214*** 
(0.00439) (0.00441) (0.00459) (0.00462) 
Party magnitude -0.0121** -0.0200*** 0.00377 -0.00521 
 (0.00583) (0.00585) (0.00608) (0.00610) 
2000    0.453*** 
    (0.0224) 
2004  -0.205***  0.277*** 
  (0.0187)  (0.0224) 
2008  -0.194***  0.277*** 
  (0.0192)  (0.0221) 
2012  -0.468***   
  (0.0210)   
     
cut1 -0.726*** -0.434*** -0.830*** 0.0144 
 (0.0615) (0.0688) (0.0693) (0.0903) 
cut2 2.990*** 3.287*** 2.921*** 3.768*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0704) (0.0707) (0.0918) 
Variance 
(Random effects 
by district) 
  0.0605*** 0.0564*** 
  (0.00483) (0.00467) 
Observations 109156 109156 109156 109156 
Standard errors in parentheses   
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"   
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Table 6.5: Codebook 
 
VARIABLE NAME  VARIABLE CODING RULE32 
CANDIDATE 
PERSISTANCE 
Persistence on running for 
office in t+1 
0=No 
1=Yes 
 
CANDIDATE 
PERSISTENCE 2 
Persistence on running for 
office in t+1 
0=No 
1=Yes, same office 
2=Yes, higher rank office 
FEMALE Gender of the candidate 0=Male 
1=Female 
 
Coded using the first name of 
candidates 
% OF VOTES Margin of defeat/victory For losers: distance respect to 
the last winner inside the 
coalition 
 
For winners: distance respect 
to the first loser inside the 
coalition  
LOSING Outcome of election t  0=Won the seat 
1=Lost the seat 
OFFICE GOVERNOR Whether the candidate holds a 
governor’s office at t 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE SENATOR Whether the candidate holds a 
senator’s office at t 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE FEDERAL DEPUTY Whether the candidate holds a 
federal deputy’s office at t 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE STATE DEPUTY Whether the candidate holds a 
state deputy’s office at t 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE MAYOR BIG 
MUNICIPALITY 
Whether the candidate holds a 
mayor’s office of a big 
municipality at t (more than 
199,999 voters) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE MAYOR Whether the candidate holds 
the mayor’s office of a small 
municipality at t (less than 
200,000 voters) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
OFFICE CITY COUNCIL Whether the candidate holds 
the city council’s office at t 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE GOVERNOR Whether the candidate had run 
for a governor’s office at t but 
she/he did not win the seat 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE SENATOR Whether the candidate had run 
for a senator’s office at t but 
0=No 
1=Yes 
                                                
32 Empty coding rule means that no specific coding rule was needed.  
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she/he did not win the seat 
CANDIDATE FEDERAL 
DEPUTY 
Whether the candidate had run 
for a federal deputy’s office at 
t but she/he did not win the 
seat 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE STATE 
DEPUTY 
Whether the candidate had run 
for a state deputy’s office at t 
but she/he did not win the seat 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE MAYOR BIG 
MUNICIPALITY 
Whether the candidate had run 
for a mayor’s office in a big 
municipality at t but she/he did 
not win the seat (more than 
199,999 voters) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE MAYOR Whether the candidate had run 
for a mayor’s office in a small 
municipality at t but she/he did 
not win the seat (less than 
200,000 voters) 
0=No 
1=Yes 
CANDIDATE CITY 
COUNCIL 
Whether the candidate had run 
for a city council’s Office at t 
but she/he did not win the seat 
0=No 
1=Yes 
SUPPORT FOR WOMEN IN 
POLITICS 
Support for women in politics 
at the state level 
State-year average of support 
for women in politics. 
Calculated from LAPOP 
survey data. For missing 
values I used missing data 
imputation based on a) state, 
b) year, and c) region. 
  
Source: Latin America Public 
Opinion Project 2007-2014. 
 
Original question: “In general, 
men are better political leaders 
than women; do you strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree?”  
 
Positive values indicate more 
support for women. 
 
Election years were merged 
with the closest previous 
year of the survey 
BIG CITY Size of the district in terms of 
voters 
0=Less than 200,000 voters 
1=More than 199,999 
voters=1  
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Note: 200,000 voters is the 
legal threshold in Brazil to 
define the electoral system for 
Mayor elections (Simple 
plurality or majority) 
GENDER QUOTA Presence of a regulated gender 
quota in the election 
0=Elections held before 2009 
1=Elections held after 2009 
CANDIDATES 
COMPETING IN DISTRICT 
Number of candidates 
competing at the district-year 
 
CANDIDATES 
COMPETING IN 
COALITION 
Number of candidates 
competing at the coalition 
district-year 
 
CANDIDATES 
COMPETING IN PARTY 
Number of candidates 
competing at the party-
coalition district-year 
 
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE Seats at stake in a district-year  
COALITION MAGNITUDE Number of seats won by a 
coalition in a given district-
year 
 
PARTY MAGNITUDE Number of seats won by a 
party-coalition in a given 
district-year 
 
% OF WOMEN ELECTED 
Percentage of women elected 
in a given election 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
% OF WOMEN WITH 
CANDIDATE EXPERIENCE 
Percentage of women with 
previous experience as 
candidate in t-1 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
% OF MEN WITH 
CANDIDATE EXPERIENCE 
Percentage of men with 
previous experience as 
candidate in t-1 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
% OF FEMALE 
INCUMBENT RUNNING 
Percentage of female 
incumbents 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
% OF MALE INCUMBENT 
RUNNING 
Percentage of male 
incumbents 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
NUMBER OF WOMEN 
RUNNING 
Number of women running in 
a given district-year 
Values obtained by collapsing 
the candidate at data the 
district-year level 
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